Austin Bay Blog

Reuel Marc Gerecht (with a vague echo of Yeats) asks Can the Shiite Center Hold?

An excerpt:

Contrary to what so many in the Bush administration hoped, Iraq’s salvation still rides with the two forces that few had foreseen: the religious Shiites, who recognize Ayatollah Sistani as moral guide, not the secularists in whom U.S. officials placed such store; and the U.S. military, which remains the only effective counterinsurgency force capable of diminishing sectarian strife and staunching Sunni-led violence. Together, they can corner the militants in their midst; if either falters, Iraq will probably descend into hell.

Contrary to what the former U.S.-appointed Prime Minister Ayad Allawi recently asserted, Iraq isn’t yet in a civil war if one uses that term to describe an irreversibly cataclysmic struggle.

That’s one definition of civil war — the deluge. As I’ve said previously, Iraq has been involved in a civil war since Summer 2003. Saddam’s minions are attempting to restore the ancien regime.

But the core of Gerecht’s article is his assessment of Iranian influence –or how Iran is capable of influencing Iraq, particularly its Shia community.

An excerpt:

We can certainly expect to see Iraqi Shiites cut short-term deals with Iran–the crushing poverty in many Shiite regions of Iraq will guarantee the cash-laden Iranians influence. But it is fear of the Sunni insurgency and holy warriors that gives Iran real traction in Iraqi society. If the insurgency abates, the Iraqi army becomes more powerful, or Iraqi Shiite militias become bolder (and they certainly appear to be more effective in striking Sunnis even in well-armed, solidly Sunni neighborhoods), Iran’s influence will wane. Though definitely weakened by the constant savage Sunni attacks against the Shiites, which make Shiite clerics counseling forbearance look somewhat unworldly, Ayatollah Sistani still holds sufficient sway to guarantee that negotiations among the Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds continue. Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of Sciri, the dominant Shiite political party, is well aware that if Ayatollah Sistani were publicly to signal dismay with his actions, his political power would shrink considerably, probably even jeopardizing Sciri’s existence. It is Sciri’s clerical connections–the Hakim family is among the most prominent, and in the holy city of Najaf, among the most moderate, of Iraq’s influential clerical families–that give it real strength.

Washington currently has no Shiite “partner” in Iraq. In all probability, it will not find one. Stained by reports of corruption in his interim government, Ayad Allawi may well be finished as a significant political player. And his antireligious, “pro-Sunni” secular disposition doomed him long ago among most Shiites. Though still seen as the brightest politician, Deputy Prime Minister Ahmad Chalabi was annihilated in the parliamentary elections. The current prime minister, Ibrahim Jaafari, a leader of the Dawa Party, is too politically inept and his party’s alliance with Sadr is likely to grow stronger. (On a grassroots level, Dawa is easily as radical as Sadr’s Mahdi Army.) Which leaves Adil Abd al-Mahdi of Sciri, probably the only major player in Sciri with whom the Americans culturally feel comfortable. (Though sincerely religious, Mahdi is highly Westernized and lay, free of the evasive speech of Shiite clerics.) But Mahdi isn’t Sciri.

Gerecht’s analysis here is similar to StrategyPage’s take on the SUnnis’ growing realization that the “SHia sheep” are no longer sheep:

the attack in Samarra didn’t blow apart the democratic Shiite consensus led by Ayatollah Sistani. The various, often mutually hostile, Shiite parties, are likely to plow ahead, however fitfully, to some political deal with the Sunnis and the Kurds, who both now know that the Shiites will no longer passively watch their women and children slaughtered and their holy sites desecrated. Sunni and Kurdish fear of Shiite power–a fickle but growing alliance between Sunni Arabs and Kurds was inevitable–is politically overdue and healthy for all concerned. This is a tightrope act, but the Sunni Arabs must internalize the fact that they cannot leverage the insurgency into power. If they continue to try, they will only convert Shiite “sheep” (the traditional Arab Sunni view of Arab Shiites) into rampant “lions,” unstoppable by even the most revered, peace-promoting divines.

Here’s Gerecht’s recommended operation:

We are now in the unenviable position of having to confront radicalized, murderous Shiite militias, who have gained broader Shiite support because of the Sunni-led violence and the lameness of U.S. counterinsurgency operations. The Bush administration would be wise not to postpone any longer what it should have already undertaken–securing Baghdad. This will be an enormously difficult task: Both Sunnis and Shiites will have to be confronted, but Sunni insurgents and brigands must be dealt with first to ensure America doesn’t lose the Shiite majority and the government doesn’t completely fall apart. Pacifying Baghdad will be politically convulsive and provide horrific film footage and skyrocketing body counts. But Iraq cannot heal itself so long as Baghdad remains a deadly place. And the U.S. media will never write many optimistic stories about Iraq if journalists fear going outside. To punt this undertaking down the road when the political dynamics might be better, and when the number of American soldiers in Iraq will surely be less, perhaps a lot less, is to invite disaster.
The Iraqis and the Americans will either save or damn Iraq in the coming months. Quite contrary to the purblind charges of Michigan’s Democratic Sen. Carl Levin, the Iraqis really are doing their part–better than what anyone historically could have expected. The real question is, will Gen. Abizaid and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld do theirs?

Read the whole thing.