The Road to Iraq’s New Democratic Government– and this week’s column
The acting speaker of Iraq’s parliament said he will re-convene the legislature next week — with the goal of forming a new government. Here’s the AP wire report.
The lede:
The acting parliament speaker said Wednesday he will convene the Iraqi legislature next week to push forward the formation of a new government stalled over the issue of who will serve as prime minister.
Adnan Pachachi, a Sunni Arab, told a press conference he decided to convene the assembly because “it’s my duty to the Iraqi people in order to preserve the credibility of the democratic process.”
Pachachi added that Shiite politicians told him they hope to have the deadlock over the nomination of Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari resolved in time for the session.
Parliament was elected Dec. 15 but has held only one session because of the dispute over the prime minister.
This week’s column (written yesterday, out this morning) deal’s with the “deep story” behind the Iraqi parliament’s “long pause.” That story is the Interior Ministry and Iraqi nationalists “quiet war” on Muqtada Sadr and his Mahdi militia.
The column relates a conversation I had in Iraq with one of my bosses, British Major-General Andrew Graham. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistaniwas the subject of that conversation.
An excerpt:
Late one afternoon in mid-August, I delivered a brief report to British Maj. Gen. Andrew Graham in his Al Faw Palace office (west of Baghdad). Graham, as deputy commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq, had been deeply involved in directing the coalition’s military response to Sadr’s audacious move.
After discussing my report, Graham asked, “Remember what I said about Ayatollah Sistani?”
Graham was referring Iraq’s leading Shia cleric, Grand Ayatollah Al-Sayid Ali al-Husseini al-Sistani. A week earlier, Graham had told me: “Sistani is a living example of an apolitical Islamic clergyman. He specifically says his role is that of spiritual guide.”
I told Graham I recalled our conversation.
“He’s central to resolving the situation Najaf,” Graham said. He added that winning the global war against Islamist extremism meant that moderate Muslim clerics had to speak out, but — and here’s the quote I remember — “The pro-democracy moderate Muslim cleric doesn’t have to be found. That’s Sistani. Fortunately, he is the most influential religious leader in Iraq.”
Within two weeks, Sistani helped engineer a withdrawal of Sadr’s militia from the mosque. Tactically (and with little media fanfare), coalition military units had mauled Sadr’s militia. Superficially, Sadr had “lived to fight another day.” But the mosque wasn’t rubble. Damage to the mosque was blamed on Sadr’s militiamen. (Iraqi police also found pornographic magazines left by Sadr’s men inside the mosque.) The people of Najaf greeted coalition troops as liberators.
The column discusses Sistani’s behind the scenes role in Iraq and his “quietist” philosophy. Sistani believes spiritual leaders should avoid day to day politics and act as spiritual guides and examples. Quietism contrasts sharply with Khoeminism.
The column also discusses a promise made by Sistani’s aides that Sistani would handle Muqtada Sadr– as long as the coalition and the Iraqi government did not make a martyr of Sadr.
Another excerpt:
Outsiders — including U.S. government officials — can bewail the Iraqi parliament’s lack of progress in forming a government, but since the middle of March I strongly suspect the hidden story has been the Interior Ministry and the Iraqi nationalists’ war on Sadr. It’s a quiet police and political war waged with the blessing of Ayatollah Sistani. Creating a strong and stable Iraqi government (the so-called “national rescue front”) is the goal. Sistani has advised Shia leaders to make concessions to Sunnis in order to establish a “unity government.” That’s an action anathema to Sadr.
The first week of April I began reading reports that Sistani had told Iraqi leaders they would have to compromise with one another. It appears he has also said nothing about the Interior Ministry’s squeeze on Shia militias — and silence in this case is read as tacit approval. A US Army colonel I served with on the Multi-National Corps-Iraq staff told me at the height of the Battle of Najaf that Sistani’s aides said (and I am paraphrasing) that everyone knew Muqtada Sadr was a nut and that he did not have full control of his own organization. “Sistani’s aides say Sadr is a nut but he’s a nut that requires special handling.” My compatriot was frustrated– he felt that the coalition had let Sadr escape after the Mahdi militia uprising was smashed in April and May 2004. He did not want that to happen again. The colonel was in what I’ll describe as a “position to know” what Sistani’s spokesmen had to say.
There was no debate, however, that Sistani was a central figure in Iraq and a man worthy of personal respect.
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Do you have any concerns that Al Sistani is playing long ball here - working quietly to get rid of the troublesome and undisciplined Al Sadr in order to put together a political process that Shia religious leaders (with or without Iran’s backing) can dominate in the future, when U.S. concerns have waned and a withdrawal is well underway or complete? The Shia still have a flat majority, near supermajority in Iraq. Based on some of Al Sistani’s recent commments, I’m not sure he is moderate as we would understand it, and I have concerns that he is only moderate in the sense that he will settle for achieving a lockdown Sharia rule by gradual, democratic means, rather than insisisting on it at the point of a gun. ED NOTE: This is a fair question to ask. However, Sistani’s long-held public opinions and his quiet leadership argue that he’s a genuine candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize. I’d say the burden of proof is on the conspiracy theorists — ie, that Sistani is a calculating Islamist. That’s a fear but where’s the evidence for it? His words and actions suggest demonstrate otherwise. Here’s the real fear regarding Sistani– his health. The man is fragile. He spent part of August 2004 in a British hospital. His heart is weak. There’s evidence to support this worry– and the policy consideration would be “you can’t rely on Sistani’s moderating influence over the long haul because of his precarious health.” Thanks for the comment.
Comment by Al Maviva — 4/12/2006 @ 7:03 am
Excellent insight, confirms a lot what I’ve been guessing about Sadr for a while. Thanks for sharing. One does have to wonder how much control he actually has over his minions, especially given that his office was mortared by his own people shortly after that raid. I get the feeling he’s riding the tiger. Al’s suspicions are understandable. Religious institutions often serve primarily as a means to empower the clergy at the expense of the laypeople, but Sistani seems to be the real deal. His health is a major concern. I hope Sistani has a train of like-minded successors in waiting.
Comment by TallDave — 4/12/2006 @ 9:08 am
“…I’m not sure he is moderate as we would understand it, and I have concerns that he is only moderate in the sense that he will settle for achieving a lockdown Sharia rule by gradual, democratic means,” Even so, there is nothing we can do about it. Afghanistan has a Sharia constitution. If the Iraqis adopt Sharia by democratic means, that is their choice. The world has to live with it. Btw, a so-called advisory committee in the Netherlands advised the govt. to accept Sharia. We have more things to worry about than Sharia in Iraq.
Comment by ic — 4/12/2006 @ 9:22 am
Sistani in the Breach Austin Bay posts an excellent piece up at Strategy Page, and harkens back to 2004 to place breaking news in Iraq into context. Bay, something of a Multinational Force palace insider, recalls the circumstances of the “uprising” of the Muqtada Sadr’s…
Trackback by Dadmanly — 4/12/2006 @ 11:54 am
US impatience with the slow-growing democracy cultures in other countries doesn’t make the democracy grow faster. Just more twisted, and corrupt. How many of the Sunnis being killed by “death squads” were former Ba’athists? I never see numbers about this question, and seldom even the note that many were former Saddam servants. The Shia murdered are far more likely to have NOT been functionaries in Saddam’s state. Sistani’s health is an issue; who will be PM is an issue. Two more weeks is not that long to wait, but after an already too long 4 months it seems forever. I doubt that al-Jaafari will be the new one. Democracy is, even more importantly than voting, the peaceful transfer of power from one healthy living person to another. G. Washington was surprisingly amazing about this; Mugabe all too usual. Jaafari, and Iraq, is about to learn this most important democratic lesson. I hope.
Comment by Tom Grey - Liberty Dad — 4/12/2006 @ 3:59 pm
Thank you for the clarity you bring to the many tangled threads that make up military foreign policy. Please help clarify the situation in Iraq for people in America by supporting http://www.vetsforfreedom.org. They are working to balance the huge slant in the American media regarding Iraq.
Comment by RabidMonkey — 4/13/2006 @ 9:33 pm
So far Sistani has been a force for stability, what will he do when we bomb Iran? What will Sadr do? What about Hizbola? What about the famous Arab Street? Are we vulnerable to the Iranians in Iraq? In Afghanistan? In the Persian Gulf? Hormuz is a tight and dangerous spot. I presume we can trust the Navy to control it and keep the oil flowing. Can we separate the Iranian oil regions to the south from Tehran in central Iran? How does a war end, if we refuse to occupy what we have defeated. How does “air assault” play in all of this? Will we need to do this all again in 10 years? Will the cost be low enough that we can?
Comment by Rob — 4/13/2006 @ 9:54 pm