The Operational Implications of Zarqawi’s Death
Jeffrey White at the Washington Institute writes on the organizational and operational implications of Zarqawi’s death — the implications for Al Qaeda in Iraq (Zarqawi’s terror clan) and other terror factions. Like Jim Dunnigan, White notes Zarqawi had “become a source of friction.”
Key graf in his initial analysis:
The changing political and military landscape in Iraq has forced all insurgent groups there to adapt or risk organizational destruction. Under Zarqawi, AQI has proven capable of replacing substantial losses to coalition operations of leadership at all levels of the organization, accommodating other insurgent elements, incorporating a greater Iraqi component, and contesting for power in Anbar province with disaffected Sunni tribal elements. More recently it has apparently expanded operations in Diyala province, a prime fault line for sectarian violence.
Excerpt covering near term fallout:
There is likely to be a period of disruption of AQI activity. Until a senior leadership is reestablished, there will probably be a decline in the number and quality of attacks as the organization sorts out the consequences, insures security for remaining leaders, reestablishes direction, and decides how to respond. Coordination among local leaders is also likely to be more difficult. These tasks will be more challenging if other important leaders were killed as well. Because of Zarqawi’s close identification with sectarian violence and attacks on civilians, some of the energy may go out of these kinds of actions. Surviving AQI leadership is likely to feel more vulnerable, and to be looking for support from other elements of the insurgency, rather than in pursing controversial and divisive tactics.
Excerpt on the long term:
For the longer term, one development to watch for would be how the rest of the insurgency reacts. Whether Zarqawi’s death is mourned, welcomed, or ignored, and by whom within the insurgency, will be important in gauging the strength of the insurgency’s terrorist wing. Zarqawi may have been broadly useful to the insurgents, but he was probably loved by only a few. Lasting changes in operational patterns will be of interest, especially if there is a decline in counterstability operations. This would suggest that Zarqawi’s death had long term operational impacts on the situation, not just transitory effects. In addition, the outcome of the succession process, and even whether a clear successor emerges, should reveal much about the nature, health, and prospects for AQI.
It will be important to see how Zarqawi’s death affects the “violence system” in Iraq. His organization and he himself have been important components of this system, propelling violence to higher levels and raising the prospects for civil war…
Read the entire article.
Most importantly, the AQII’s most recognizable marketeer has been snuffed with supreme precision and technological capability. More relevant is the word that insiders have turned on their beloved leader. An asymmetrical force relies on the perception of its invulnerability. Al Zarqawi was viewed as nearly contructed of kevlar anhd teflon until JJune 7. As there is no clear #2 operative, it will be interesting to see if anyone fills the gap. I am still waiting for the 1000 Usama Bin Laden’s who were promised after our assault on Afghanistan.
Comment by Citizen Deux — 6/9/2006 @ 8:43 am
There are several undefinable elements which will have no ‘metric’. Psycholgically speaking-the Iraqi people have just seen the death of their chief assasin. There is now a gap for percieved power(between the insurgents and the government among the people, which will provide an incredible opportunity to fill. Prediction? It will be harder for any insurgent to survive as long or appear as ’successful’. I’ve seen a lot of minimization of the foreign based insurgent regarding their number-5%. This is not a good way of translating their actual involvement, in effectiveness and target selction. I boldly predict a 50% reduction in ied’s, 70% in Iraqi deaths, and 80% dip in US casualites over the next three months.
Comment by mark — 6/9/2006 @ 9:28 am
Mark, I hope your predictions come true, but I doubt that they will. Rather, I would expect to see a reduction in the so-called sectarian violence (which was really Zarqawi stirring the pot and playing to the cameras), and a refocusing of the remaining elements on direct attacks on American and Iraqi security elements. They’re only hope at this point is to make the impression that the violence will never end, and they cannot hope to accomplish anything unless they can get the Americans to leave. It isn’t Iraqi discouragement that they’re after. They believe that once the Americans leave, they can gain power.
Comment by antimedia — 6/9/2006 @ 11:12 am
The right margin is superimposed over part of the comment text. The house is closer to Iran than it is to Baghdad. Any chance there was a visitor? Are they still shipping IED assys into Iraq?
Comment by SCATTERSHOT — 6/9/2006 @ 1:02 pm
Did you see Andy McCarthy on Why are intel is so sparse>? About the details in the press on who ratted Z-man out — who will rat now? The public doens’t have such a right to know that it endangers the ability to find others willing to betray their terrorist “colleagues”. Helping rats do more turning in is more important than publicizing who they were. Though I also suspect this is an early or pre-emptive leadership battle. I’m sure it MIGHT be a turning point by Sunnis. Perhaps it was even the price of getting one Sunni as the Minister (of Interior?). I hope the Sunni leaders use it, and push for an Oil Trust to share the cash among all citizens, and accept that it’s shared among all voters (voter reg to rise! And participation too!).
Comment by Tom Grey - Liberty Dad — 6/9/2006 @ 5:41 pm
It would seem one other operational impact of Zarqawi’s elimination is that it will allow the focus of numerous resources to be redirected to other threats. I would think that a not insignificant amount of coalition attention had been tied up in the Zarqawi chase. Regardless of the decisions or paths chosen by the insurgents, there will be some feeling much more heat from coalition forces than they had to endure in the past.
Comment by FRNM — 6/9/2006 @ 8:00 pm