Austin Bay Blog

A must-read essay by Mowaffak al-Rubaie in today’s Washington Post (another signal that the new Iraqi government will continue its post-Zarqawi political offensive).

The lede:

 There has been much talk about a withdrawal of U.S. and coalition troops from Iraq, but no defined timeline has yet been set. There is, however, an unofficial “road map” to foreign troop reductions that will eventually lead to total withdrawal of U.S. troops. This road map is based not just on a series of dates but, more important, on the achievement of set objectives for restoring security in Iraq.

Key excerpt:

Iraq has a total of 18 governorates, which are at differing stages in terms of security. Each will eventually take control of its own security situation, barring a major crisis. But before this happens, each governorate will have to meet stringent minimum requirements as a condition of being granted control. For example, the threat assessment of terrorist activities must be low or on a downward trend. Local police and the Iraqi army must be deemed capable of dealing with criminal gangs, armed groups and militias, and border control. There must be a clear and functioning command-and-control center overseen by the governor, with direct communication to the prime minister’s situation room.

Despite the seemingly endless spiral of violence in Iraq today, such a plan is already in place…

Another key excerpt:

Iraq’s ambition is to have full control of the country by the end of 2008. In practice this will mean a significant foreign troop reduction. We envisage the U.S. troop presence by year’s end to be under 100,000, with most of the remaining troops to return home by the end of 2007.

al-Rubaie’s “new” plan is remarkably similar to the Multi-National Force’s August 2004 objectives for Iraq. Rubaie mentions security metrics for provinces and towns (in August 2004 MNF  and Multi-National Corps-Iraq hammered out local security metrics, including a description of communications requirements– which Rubaie’s remark about a  functional command and control center echoes). Here’s what’s new– an Iraqi is saying it, an Iraqi backed by a democratically-elected Iraqi government.

Read the entire essay– then send it to the editors of the New York Times, to John Murtha, to John Kerry, to Howard Dean, to…well, the literate will read al-Rubaie’s essay and understand it, the delusional will read the DailyKos.

ADDITIONAL NOTE: The metrics are “achievement-oriented” or “capability oriented” — ie, the Iraqis are able to accomplish a mission. That means there is a goal (from the coalition’s and Iraq’s perspective, the sooner acheived the better) but no precise timetable to achieve it. Precipitous withdrawal according to a prescribed time table (instead of achieving self-sustaining Iraqi capabilities) would put the entire enterprise at risk. None of this is secret– it’s been US and coalition policy.

Last year (2005) CENTCOM commander GEN John Abizaid said he thought the last battle of the Iraq war would probably be fought by Iraqis somewhere in western Al Anbar, and that might be several years in the future. “Local control” in parts of al-Anbar might take that long to achieve. When al-Rubaie mentions coalition troops remaining at the end of 2007 and beyond he is referencing the policy of “strategic overwatch.” Not all of the overwatch force will be deployed in Iraq. How large will that force be? Here’s the right answer: depends on what the Iraqi government wants.

I recall Multi-National Corps commander LTG Tom Metz saying in June 2004 that if the Iraqi military gelled and the elections were successful, he could forsee a large coalition troop draw down in late 2006. LTG Metz said this on several occasions. The first time I heard him was after a briefing on a draft United Nations elections support plan (for the January 2005 Iraqi elections). Goals had to be achieved, however– political goals, military and security training goals, etc. That briefing dealt with UN Security Council Resolution 1546.

Key graf from 1546, regarding the first election:

c) holding of direct democratic elections by 31 December 2004 if possible, and in no case later than 31 January 2005, to a Transitional National Assembly, which will, inter alia, have responsibility for forming a Transitional Government of Iraq and drafting a permanent constitution for Iraq leading to a constitutionally elected government by 31 December 2005;

And this on improving Iraq’s own security capabilities:

- 8. Welcomes ongoing efforts by the incoming Interim Government of Iraq to develop Iraqi security forces including the Iraqi armed forces (hereinafter referred to as “Iraqi security forces”), operating under the authority of the Interim Government of Iraq and its successors, which will progressively play a greater role and ultimately assume full responsibility for the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq;

Hey, it’s a UN document– interestingly congruent with long-range coalition planning. 

UPDATE 2: This document at un.int shows how strategic guidance was (is) translated into operations. It’s a report to the UN by MNF-I from sometime in December 2004 or early January 2005.

UPDATE 3: A reader emails (through my Creators Syndicate box), regarding my comments on MNF-I and then the update on UNSCR 1546:

Read with great interest your entry on “The Way Out of Iraq.” I found the same UN document when I searched for MNF objectives in Iraq. I also found the following speech from Wolfowitz in June of ‘04 which goes over the strategy we were using in Iraq. It corresponds to what we actually have been doing. So, to people who say, there wasn’t a plan, there is plenty of evidence of a plan. http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2004/sp20040622-depsecdef0521.html Regards, Keith

Good email–thanks for sending it along. UNSCR 1546 is no secret, and the “meet the metrics before passing over control” is no secret, either. I worked with both when I served in the MNC-I Plans section in Iraq. The KosKidz response to hard facts? Read a couple of the comments on this post. But then a lot of the sensation-driven media has also missed the plan, or ignored it.