On expanding the US Army — GEN Schoomaker’s testimony
Instapundit and several other sites have been discussing US Army Chief of Staff General Pete Schoomaker’s plans to increase the size of the US Army. I say “plans” rather than request. The Army has already increased in size, especially when compared to the force structure projections of the mid to late 1990s. 9/11 is the biggest reason, but by 1995 peacekeeping commitments had already begun stressing the personnel system. The Army asked for a 30,000 troop “plus up” in the FY 1997 budget request — and as I recall that was a request for an increase in “end strength” (authorized active duty troops). My US Army War College class had a long discussion about “optempo” (pace of operations) and personnel requirements in 1997 (which is why I remember the FY1997 request). This Washington Post article from December 15 outlines Schoomaker’s basic case (drawn from congressional testimony on December 14).The Washington Post’s lede and extended comments from GEN Schoomaker:
Warning that the active-duty Army “will break” under the strain of today’s war-zone rotations, the nation’s top Army general yesterday called for expanding the force by 7,000 or more soldiers a year and lifting Pentagon restrictions on involuntary call-ups of Army National Guard and Army Reserve troops.
Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker, the Army’s chief of staff, issued his most dire assessment yet of the toll of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan on the nation’s main ground force. At one point, he banged his hand on a House committee-room table, saying the continuation of today’s Pentagon policies is “not right.”In particularly blunt testimony, Schoomaker said the Army began the Iraq war “flat-footed” with a $56 billion equipment shortage and 500,000 fewer soldiers than during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Echoing the warnings from the post-Vietnam War era, when Gen. Edward C. Meyer, then the Army chief of staff, decried the “hollow Army,” Schoomaker said it is critical to make changes now to shore up the force for what he called a long and dangerous war.“The Army is incapable of generating and sustaining the required forces to wage the global war on terror . . . without its components — active, Guard and reserve — surging together,” Schoomaker said in testimony before the congressionally created Commission on the National Guard and Reserves.The burden on the Army’s 507,000 active-duty soldiers — who now spend more time at war than at home — is simply too great, he said. “At this pace, without recurrent access to the reserve components, through remobilization, we will break the active component,” he said, drawing murmurs around the hearing room.
The need for more troops is more complex and nuanced than simply “x number of troops.” Schoomaker says the Army needs full access to the reserves –in other words, an unlimited call up capacity. Involuntary call-ups actually protect the reserve soldiers more fully — guarantees they get their jobs back, etc.
I attended a defense forumin Washington, DC hosted by Schoomaker on the evening of December 14. He elaborated a bit on his testimony — he said lifting restrictions on call-ups will allow the Pentagon to more effectively deploy entire reserve units. This may seem like inside baseball, but “building” a reserve unit ad hoc (and confronting call-up limitations) wastes time and troops. (In the Washington Post article Schoomaker says “pick up” teams don’t cut it — in context I read that as meaning ad hoc doesn’t work in the long run. Ad hoc is a gap filler. Continual ad hoc is a recipe for mission ineffectiveness and personnel burn-out.)
As for the bigger picture– I already mentioned 1997. A few knowledgeable readers may point to 1990 as the beginning of the decline. (Recall that 2nd Armored Division was already reduced to one brigade in August 1990 — and that one brigade ended up serving in the Gulf War as the USMC’s armor striking force. We were lucky Tiger Brigade was still on the rolls.) A general I know told me in July 2003 (off the record conversation) that he believed the Army would need 50,000 to 70,000 more troops to sustain a long war– particularly a war that (in his view) would entail extended peacekeeping-type missions where economic and political development were the goals. He said effective use of reserve forces would account for some of that increase, but somewhere, sometime Congress was going to have to raise the end strength and pay for it. (Money. The man said “and pay for it.”) Remember, this was a personal opinion based on “military gut” and I am relating a conversation. I don’t remember what the authorized strength level was in July 2003 but the Washington Post article and GEN Schoomaker’s testimony give the 2001 end strength as 482K. The general agreed with me that –in terms of personnel– the Army had been improvising since 1995. A blanket condemnation of that “improvisation” process would be silly. The personnel bind was the result of winning the Cold War. The US certianly didn’t need the old Cold War military structure, and from what Congress could tell in 1990-95, the US didn’t need Cold War troop levels.My off the record raconteur and I didn’t have a “magic number” in 2003. His figures weren’t a “study” but a ballpark based on some assumptions about long-term missions. I don’t think Schoomaker has a magic number now, either. Schoomaker says he wants to go to at least 512K (one source says 514K) in authorized end strength but with that 2003 conversation in mind, I would think 512K is a minimum figure. 520K to 550K would make more sense — provided we have the “cents”.As for the debate of troops versus technology — here’s where I came down on that in August 2001 (”Grunt Work.) We need both in appropriate balance. Rumsfeld was prepared to fight a Beltway war for transformation. 9/11 surprised him. It Surprised Congress. To paraphrase Sherman, strategic surprise is hell.
Schoomaker wants the force increase so that the Army can provide what I’ll call “sustained presence.” We’ve a a couple of decades ahead of us where we’ll be “nudging” political and economic change in several very hard corners.
Money. Schoomaker is quoted as saying every increase of 10K in troop strength costs $1.2 billion. We spend roughly 3.2 percent to 3.5 percent of GDP for defense. Given post 9/11 US commitments and requirements, that’s too low. What’s more realistic? I don’t know. I’d like to see the Joint Chiefs produce a “GDP percentage” figure. Perhaps they have.
Here are some more of Schoomaker’s remarks to Congress (via a press release):
In addition to our dramatic modular conversion and rebalancing
efforts, we have made great strides increasing Soldier and unit
effectiveness through our modernization and reset efforts. This is
improving how we eq~lipth e Army across all components, including the
National Guard. Frankly, we entered this war flatfooted. Investment
accounts were under-funded by approximately $1 00 billion, resulting in
nearly $56 billion in equipment shortages across the Army. To make
reserve component units combat ready, we had to pool personnel and
equipment from across the force. We also cascaded older equipment to
the reserve components. This is no longer the standard. For example, we
have fielded new Abrams Integrated Management (AIM) tanks, howitzers,
and corr~municationse quipment to the National Guard. The reserve
components receive our bed night vision equipment, GPS receivers,
battle command equipment, and trucks. The reserve corr~ponentsa re
getting modern equipment at an unprecedented pace.
Given the National Guard’s role as both an operational force and
the States’ first military responder for homeland defense and civil support,
the Army is conimitted to resource the Army National Guard consistent
with those roles. For instance, we teamed with the National Guard
leadership to identify dual use equipment in their “essential 10″
capabilities. We have since fenced more than $21 billion for ground
systems procurement and $1.9 billion in aviation equipment in fiscal years
2005 through 201 1 - greater .than a four-fold increask over fiscal years
2003 to 2009. In close collaboration with the National Guard, we have
also fielded over 11,000 pieces of critical equipment to priority hurricane
states. The Army Reserve remains the Nation’s ,First Title 10 responder to
provide assistance in serious natural or manmade disasters, accidents, or
catastrophes that occur in the United States and it territories. To ensure
they can meet these responsibilities we have fenced $1.9 billion for Army
Reserve procurement in fiscal years 2005 through 2011.
“Underfunded by 100 billion dollars.” So what’s the appropriate GDP figure? 4 percent? Does congressional support exist for this increase? Does this increase support a “strategic war winning force?” However, the issue isn’t merely military power or “how much” military power. We do a terrible job of “unified action” — uniting our diplomatic, information/intelligence, military, and economic elements of power (DIME is the acronym). Some background on this critical point. The military cannot “win” a global war for modernity; the military is merely part of a winning combination. Winning takes all elements of power applied and applied in a sustained, focused (yet flexible) manner. Victory in the Global War on Terror is an incremental process. Fact is, this is a Millennium War. (From January 2005).
One of the problems we face in defining what constitutes an American victory or acceptable End State in the global war on terror is the war’s dirt-stupid name. One might as well declare war on exercise as declare war on terror, for terror is only a tactic used by an enemy. In this case the inept name has led to needless political confusion and loss of clarity about long-range goals.
In September 2001, I suggested we call this hideous conflict the Millennium War, a nom de guerre that captures both the chronological era and the ideological dimensions of the conflict. If there is one mistake we’ve made in fighting this war, it’s the way we’ve soft-pedaled the ideological dimensions, and that soft-pedaling has blurred our goals. This really is a fight for the future, a battle between our free, open political system and the unholy alliance of despots and millenarian Islamofascists whose very existence depends on denying liberty.
Recognizing the ideological component as an essential feature of the war indicates the most desirable End State to the war would have two features: (1) democratic nations that police terrorism, instead of promoting it or seeding it; (2) an Islamic clerisy that understands its role on Earth is spiritual guidance and education, not temporal political control.
A large order? The task is absolutely huge, but so was World War II, when heavy history fell on “the greatest generation.” It’s this generation’s turn to accept the challenge of building free nation states and protecting Muslim moderates, or we will face terrible destructive consequences.
That’s the context for requesting “sustaining” troop increases. It’s the context for establishing an expeditionary State Department, Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce (etc) as well.
UPDATE: From the Futurist on the spread of democracy. The post includes some of the anticipated strategic effects of expanding democracy.
Great set of figures for putting this into digestible and intelligible context. I’ve linked to you here: http://consul-at-arms.blogspot.com/2006/12/re-on-expanding-us-army-gen.html
Comment by Consul-At-Arms — 12/17/2006 @ 4:30 pm
Is there really any good reason to NOT have a maximum size military? Good post though Austin.
Comment by Mark Eichenlaub — 12/17/2006 @ 5:33 pm