Thoughts on the British surrender
Last week Dean Barnett questioned the British sailors’ and marines’ decision to surrender to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Dean wondered if the phrase “fighting back was not an option” would be the epitaph on the grave of the Western world. A fair enough point to make about the confrontation with Islamo-fascism, but having chased Iranian and Arab dhow in RHIBs (rigid hull inflatable boats) manned by American sailors I understand how exposed and vulnerable the British sailors were. (A couple of weeks ago in a Creators Syndicate column I discussed small ship inspection and boarding operations in the northern Persian Gulf.)
The criminal kidnapping was certainly no Churchillian moment for the Royal Navy. I don’t think Dean and I disagree about the subsequent events; they were a moral disaster. Tehran goody bags and gimme suits have replaced blood, sweat, tears and toil.
But here’s how I see the tactical situation. The Iranians got the drop– they conducted a well planned and rehearsed surround and snatch. The sailors and marines were not in a warship when they were captured, they were in motorized rubber boats. Tactical surprise reinforced by heavy machineguns at close range (and lack of immediate backup) make surrender an understandable and probably appropriate decision. The situations strikes me as one of instant, futile slaughter.
Better planning, better coordination with the supporting forces, and tighter tactical security may well have alerted and saved the sailors and marines. However, would, should, and could are the words of hindsight when staring down the bore of a heavy machinegun.
In an email, Dean referred men to a Jack Jacobs interview on NBC. I respect Jacobs a great deal—first class analyst, absolutely outstanding soldier in all respects. In that interview Jacobs excoriates the British sailors for their behavior before capture, during capture, during their confinement and after their release. Still, after watching a re-run of the interview, I think much of Jacobs’ fury is sparked by the sailors’ on-camera behavior. Jacobs is rightesouly angered and embarrassed by the television shenanigans. I think that behavior is terrible and reprehensible – a thoroughly shoddy spectacle. That shoddy television spectacle, however, doesn’t make the decision to surrender the wrong one. The other behavior needs to be separated from the surrender. I know that’s tough to do. The argument will be made that the same personnel who kissed rings capitulated. However, in my view, second-guessing the tactical decision to surrender given our current understanding of the circumstances presumes far too much.
As I wrote last week, I think the Iranians hurt themselves in the mid-term and long run. The Iranians got a ring kissed but they blinked strategically. The regime temporarily changed the subject from nuclear weapons and UN sanctions, but reminded the world that since 1979 Iran has been an outlaw. Now the mullahs intend to become nuclear outlaws.
The civilized world needs to return the favor. Not with a tit for tat tactical response, but with definitive strategic pressure. Iran is an empire, with Iranians comprising somewhat over fifty percent of the population. The Baluchis (in eastern Iran) are already restless, as are the Shia Arabs in Khuzistan (western Iran along the border with Iraq). Iranian Azeri and Kurd minorities also have long-simmering troubles with Tehran. These are strategic vulnerabilities. Iran has a limited domestic refining capacity and imports refined petroleum products. That’s another strategic vulnerability. “Mullah moolah” (cash generated by graft and bribery) is banked overseas. That is a very specific vulnerability that also highlights the regime’s abysmal corruption.
