GEN Petraeus’ Chief Counter-Insurgency Adviser on “Iraqi Narratives”
This morning I participated in a telephonic question and answer session with Dr. David Kilcullen, senior counter-insurgency advisor to Gen. David Petraeus and Multi-National Force -Iraq. On the phone Kilcullen discussed the planning process behind the development of the “Baghdad surge strategy.” Dr. Kilcullen is a lieutenant-colonel in the Australian Army reserve.
An extract from his bio:
Before serving in Iraq he was the chief counter-terrorism strategist for the U.S. State Department, a job that involved field work in Iraq, Afghanistan, the northwest frontier of Pakistan, and the Horn of Africa, as well as policy planning in Washington, D.C. Kilcullen previously served as a senior analyst in Australia’s Office of National Assessments, and is a former Australian infantry officer with operational service in East Timor, Bougainville and the Middle East, and a professional background in counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare. He worked in the Pentagon as special adviser for counter-terrorism during the 2005 U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review, and was a member of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s writing team for Australia’s 2004 White Paper on Terrorism. His doctoral dissertation, completed in 2000, analyses the political effects of insurgency and counter-insurgency on traditional Muslim societies, and involved extended fieldwork with members of Dar’ul Islam, the forerunner to terrorist group Jema’ah Islamiyah.
In 2006 Dr. Kilcullen wrote an article for IOSPHERE (a publication of the Joint Informations Operations Center) on counter-insurgency. He said that pursuing a successful counter-insurgency means “exploiting a single narrative” to counter the enemy’s “narrative.”
Here’s part of his analysis from that article:
“Since counterinsurgency is a competition to mobilize popular support, it pays to know how people are mobilized. In most societies there are opinionmakers: local leaders, pillars of the community, religious figures, media personalities, and others who set trends and influence public perceptions. This influence—including the pernicious influence of the insurgents—often takes the form of a “single narrative.” This is a simple, unifying, easily-expressed story or explanation that organizes people’s experience and provides a framework for understanding events. Nationalist and ethnic historical myths, or sectarian creeds, provide such a narrative. The Iraqi insurgents have one, as do al- Qaida and the Taliban. To undercut their influence you must exploit an alternative narrative: or better yet, tap into an existing narrative that excludes the insurgents. This narrative is often worked out for you by higher headquarters—but only you have the detailed knowledge to tailor the narrative to local conditions and generate leverage from it.”
If it sounds something like a political campaign, that’s because it is –politics, including politics by other means. The Madison Avenue mogul would call it advertising.
I think the Bush Administration has done a mediocre to miserable job of countering “enemy narratives.” Why even give it a mediocre rating? Because battlefield victory counters a lot of hot air. Our enemies have been exposed as weak and limited – which is one reason they primarily target the “softest” targets: Iraqi civilians.
I asked Kilcullen: “What is the single narrative (or alternative narrative) in Iraq? And this is a two-part question. Could you gives us an example of a narrative in a Baghdad neighborhood?”
The answer below is from my typed notes, so bits and pieces of his response are missing. However, you’ll get the gist of his answer.
Dr. David Kilcullen:
Good question. That’s been one of the weaknesses in this business over time. I think it is something that is improving now. We have to make certain the story, the message people are getting from Iraqi government institutions is same as message from the US (sources). One of our problems we found is how difficult it is for Americans to generate a message Iraqis find convincing. (That’s why) we need to work with Iraqis, and we are in the supporting role.
(At the moment) the Iraqi government is putting out this message to the people: that you don’t need militias to protect you against terrorists. The government can do that. Gain trust in the government to protect you and move from a dependency on militias.
The first thing an American commander must do (as he enters an operational area) is sit down with Iraqi commander and determine what local neighborhood views are on issues. Often their views may strike us as hard to believe. The Americans must work with their Iraqi counterparts.
(They) find ones that work, then track how they are working.
As for an example of getting people to support you in some parts of Baghdad – the program to separate (threatened neighborhood) from militias. There has been a big effort to recruit and employ police in place and demonstrate presence on 24 hour basis. This is so that they (the people in the neighborhood) feel the change. US forces are largely working to protect against and prevent dissidents from coming into a neighborhood. One of big ways AQI undermines credibility is to get a terrorist through and carrie out a large bombing. US forces’ primary contribution is not delivering a message but creating safe space where Iraqis can deliver the message. (Successful counter-insurgency fighters) must understand what a population really believes (about a situation) then track closely and continuously
The single narrative the US has pursued is that as they (Iraqis) stand up, we stand down. That message is not particularly comforting to Iraqis. The single big message (the Iraqi government and coalition are sending) now is that we are protecting the population and trying to achieve sustainable stability. We are improving security and doing it to create a sustainable space so Iraqis can do it themselves.
You have power to the degree that others consider that supporting your goals is the best way for them to achieve theirs. Tyrants make it simple: do what I want, or your wish to remain alive and undamaged will be frustrated. Liberals claim that dreaming together and soft talk will turn away all savage beasts. So the coalition and MNF must a) articulate a goal clearly; and b) give convincing evidence that helping pursue that goal is the best way for Iraqis to have the space, freedom, and resources to attain their own (goals). For those few who want short-term or incompatible goals, they will have to be inspired to take a longer and wider view, or directly opposed in the case of dedicated theocrats or foreign cats’-paws. Sadr is both of the latter. The power he has is partly illusory, but in any case will only be undercut successfully if it can be demonstrated to his rather unsophisticated constituency that his plans and methods are abusive and unworkable, and that there’s a much less destructive path to security and prosperity. His gloss of religiosity is also very thin and readily stripped away if Sistani and other actual clerical authorities choose to do so.
Comment by Brian H — 5/25/2007 @ 11:55 am
It’s so sad that the pentagon and the white house ignored the lesson of Vietnam in that the enemy at home needs at least as much attention as the enemy on the battlefield. Probably even moreso today with the increased capabilities to destroy the enemy. The media, the enemy sympathizers within the “anti-war movement”, and domestic political opportunists with such a cynical view that they are willing to force an American perception of defeat for political gain for themselves were virtually ignored. This failure to counter them compentently is almost criminal.
Comment by Steve — 5/25/2007 @ 1:14 pm
America can not, and never could, win in Iraq — only Iraqis can win. What America can do is to make sure that the winning Iraqis are those who support democracy, and some modern ideas of human rights. The desire of Americans for “America to win” is the biggest problem — and also why we lost in Vietnam. Because, of course, it wasn’t Americans who were murdered by the thousands by the N. Viet commine winners after the Dem Party voted to lose in 1975, it was our S. Viet allies. Yeah, the corrupt, incompetent, and cowardly allies — who did support democracy. The narrative should be: only when peace loving Iraqis stop the terrorists will there be peace in Iraq. The Americans are only there to make sure the terrorists can win any big battles. The Iraqis have to do the real work. It has ALWAYS been the need for the Iraqis to do it. ED NOTE: Good to see you back, Tom. And a great comment. I see AF Dad has returned and a few other regulars. I’ll take this opportunity to address the comments policy for new readers. I don’t have time to moderate comments, never did. We’re relying on the new SpamKarma program, which does occasionally arbitrarily eliminate a legitimate comment. We’ll just have to live with that. “Rev Don Sensing (LTC, ret)” rules apply to all comments.
Comment by Tom Grey - Liberty Dad — 5/25/2007 @ 3:09 pm
Steve, I see your point: “The media, the enemy sympathizers within the “anti-war movementâ€, and domestic political opportunists with such a cynical view that they are willing to force an American perception of defeat for political gain for themselves were virtually ignored. This failure to counter them compentently is almost criminal.” But remember what the domestic opposition narrative would be if the White House and the Pentagon” were to do just that, as we’ve already seen a glimpse. You know the rap: “White House spin,” “manufacturing the news,” etc. This really has to happen beyond the Pentagon and White House. Maybe all the WH and Pentagon can do is set the right conditions for this narrative to propagate. And the best way to do that is through progress in the battlespace. The problem, perhaps, is the domestic demand for (historically speaking) instant gratification.
Comment by Anonymous — 5/25/2007 @ 3:46 pm
When the mainstream media is obsessed with deconstruction of narrative to promote a meme favorable to Democratic candidates, they belie basic counterinsurgency strategy and aid the terrorists.
Comment by apetrelli — 5/25/2007 @ 5:41 pm
The article and the comments made point to the same reality: Bush is fighting insurgencies on two fronts - the villages and cities in Iraq and the cities in America. Both insurgencies feed off each other in their common hatred of the paradigm shift Bush has conducted. At least we have a name for the Iraqi insurgency, an understanding of its organization and infrastructure, and - at last! - a counter-insurgency strategy. I’m not sure we even have a name for the insurgency in America, though we do know its infrastructure and we’re only too familiar with it’s operation (having seen it in action during the Vietnam War). How to defeat the insurgency in America? What is the narrative that will work, and who can deliver it? The Republican Party has proven itself neither capable nor willing. So much for politicians carrying on the political fight. What is the message and what is the infrastructure in place to deliver it? Until we have an answer to those two fundamental questions the American front against Bush will continue unabated and continue to feed and support its sister insurgency in Iraq, no matter how much the Iraq insurgency is weakened by Dr. Kilcullen’s inspired efforts.
Comment by Julian — 5/26/2007 @ 11:16 am
It is beyond argument that ultimately Iraqis are responsible for what happens to their country.But they can’t create a peaceful country without America’s support. Iraiqis seem to be moving in the right direction. The criticism of President Bush’s communications strategy and competence is IMHO justified, however the failure to implement a winning counterinsurengy strategy earlier is not. The key to the said strategy is the work of IA and IP and the Iraq govenement. These entities weren’t able to do their part in an effective counterinsugency strategy until recently.
Comment by Terry Gain — 5/26/2007 @ 8:29 pm
My studies have led me to conclude that underlying people’s actions, both logical and illogical, both productive and destructive, is what I term a “mythology” - and it appears this is my way of saying there is a basic “narrative.” Mythologies are writ large, at the national level, most notably by the ideas brought for in the Declaration of Independance but also in more specific smaller ways, within organizations such as NASA and the USAF. Mythologies can be very productive or very destructive or a bit of both. The Mythology followed by the Palistinians -”through sheer force of our will we will drive the Jews into the sea” is highly destructive. The Mythology followed by NASA under the Apollo program produced a short lived triumph and a long term disaster. The problem the U.S. advancing a Mythology among the Iraqis is that our National one - “all men are created equal and are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights” does not fit very well with the experience of and conditions in the Middle East. And below the National level, the U.S. Mythology has become a “To each his own Personal Mythology.” We don’t have a mythology we can offer up to the Iraqis that will work there - Neither does the Batthists and Islamic Facists, really, but they have the advantage of both the thoughtless use of brutality and the constant use of lies. So our message is inevitably “Whatever you want to do; it is up to you.” while our enemy is far more specific: “Do this or die.”
Comment by RWE — 5/27/2007 @ 11:45 am
What is the single narrative (or alternative narrative) in Iraq The narrative is dominance by the Shiite political class with their Persianate mullahs. A tough sell in Sunni neighborhoods. As they say in Wyoming, you can put lipstick on a pig, but it’s still a pig.
Comment by Mark Zimmerman — 5/28/2007 @ 4:37 pm
The U.S. has the power to weaken the insurgency until ot it becomes effectively background noise to whatever goes on in Iraq. But that power, as everyone knows, requires constancy of Will–to use it. The Will can only be maintained by beating the insurgency here at home–the one operated by the Left through opinion setting offices of politicians, MSM, and Academia. What is there left to influence those citizens who can be influenced? Of course, solid military victories are necessary, but, as the Tet offensive proved, not sufficient. The only thing we have at our disposal that I can see is the internet. People have to organize themselves on the internet into advocacy groups to counter the warped analyses provided by the opponents of the war–and to a large extent these are the same as opponents of Bush. Bush and his government have made plenty of mistakes but not, in my understanding of history, any more or worse than in practically any fought by anyone, ever. Look back and see how Lincoln was lampooned before Grant and Sherman saved his hide—by the same Copperhead Democrats as we have today. It would help if this unfair criticism of Bush were being actively countered by those who support America’s engagement in the world war against Islamofascism!
Comment by Sagredo — 5/29/2007 @ 10:33 pm
The link to the Kilcullen article titled “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency” is http://www.au.af.mil/info-ops/iosphere/iosphere_summer06_kilcullen.pdf
Comment by Walt Cropper — 5/30/2007 @ 9:36 am
Curious of how this will play out if we do not confront the Iranians and Syrians who are supplying the weapons and men to do the fighting for the enemy? This is an interesting viewpoint that on the face of it makes sense. Where am I going wrong in thinking that Col Snodgrass may make more sense than many of our more vocal or popular commentators who advocate limited war? This is no way to win a war! By Colonel Thomas Snodgrass Mon, May 21, 2007, 9:18 am http://www.saneworks.us/This-is-no-way-to-win-a-war-article-449-3.htm Before the counterinsurgency advocates become apoplectic, I am not saying that counterinsurgency should be ignored by the US military. Counterinsurgency is a vital defensive capability that definitely needs to be in our arsenal for situations like South Vietnam and Iraq. We should be prepared to employ counterinsurgency to stabilize the battlefield while we use our offensive forces to destroy the source of the insurgency in the sponsoring nation-state. The absolute basic requirement in waging successful warfare is correctly identifying the enemy! But overemphasis on counterinsurgency advocated in Col Yingling’s article would be like the football team that only practices “red zone†goal line stand defenses, but nevertheless expects to outscore its opponents and win. It’s not going to happen. Counterinsurgency as a formal US military strategy was born of the “limited war†doctrine that has infected and paralyzed US military strategic thinking since the Kennedy Administration introduced it. Limited war is intellectually flawed because it assumes that we can use gradual escalation to convince an enemy to desist from his aggressive behavior without threatening to destroy him. The imagined effect of this restraint is that the conflict will be confined geographically and limited in the application of force. The presumption of the academicians who concocted this theory of warfare which defies common sense was that the US opponent would base his decision whether or not to continue aggression on rational economic cost-benefit calculations as we slowly escalate our war efforts. Limited war is an anachronistic throwback to pre-Napoleonic 18th Century warfare when European kings and princes fought over the occupation of a border castle or province during the summer campaigning season. Since the protagonists in these wars of territorial conquest were not after revolutionary results that would disrupt the established balance of power, the limited “wars†were decided when one side or the other gained the upper hand and a treaty was then concluded that ceded territory to the victorious army for their occupation. The change to the status quo was minimal. Why any 20th or 21st century conflict theorist would believe that 18th century limited war ground rules could apply to combatants seeking the radical transformation of Marxist revolution or Islamic religious dominance is truly a monumental testimonial to the fatal human susceptibility to follow blindly ideological imperatives that have no basis in reality.
Comment by Pierre — 6/6/2007 @ 6:21 am
Excellent point, Pierre. But there’s a problem or subtlety here, I think. That is that there are both wide (even global) aspects to some conflicts, like the GWOT, and local. In Iraq’s case, the two are merged somewhat, but it’s still possible and necessary to take the “limited” goal of “nation-building” Iraq into a bulwark against ME tyrannies and reactionary theocracies, etc. Certainly the armed and info-war involvement and opposition of the wider jihadist and other tyrannical forces need to be faced both in and outside Iraq, but for moral, humanitarian, and strategic reasons Iraq should not be treated as simply a theater or battle-ground for these wider conflicts. Even though that’s actually what it is, in part. So it’s a new and sensitive balancing act. Personally, I don’t think the US and MNF have done all that badly under the circumstances.
Comment by Brian H — 6/23/2007 @ 5:03 pm