UPDATED: Return of the US Army Air Corps? No, not exactly
It’s an attempt to optimize the capabilities of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).
Thom Shanker’s article in the NY Times begins a different angle– mission friction among the armed services–and it is that as well:
Ever since the Army lost its warplanes to a newly independent Air Force after World War II, soldiers have depended on the sister service for help from the sky, from bombing and strafing to transport and surveillance.
But the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have frayed the relationship, with Army officers making increasingly vocal complaints that the Air Force is not pulling its weight.
In Afghanistan, Army officers have complained about bombing missions gone awry that have killed innocent civilians. In Iraq, Army officers say the Air Force has often been out of touch, fulfilling only half of their requests for the sophisticated surveillance aircraft that ground commanders say are needed to find roadside bombs and track down insurgents…
Shanker provides details on the Army aviation task force, which includes manned aircraft. For example:
The Army aviation task force became fully operational last July with headquarters at Camp Speicher, in the north-central city of Tikrit, and focuses its efforts on insurgents planting roadside bombs. But it also has located and attacked insurgents in battles with American and Iraqi troops, and has supported missions of the top-secret Special Operations units assigned to capture or kill the most high-value targets in Iraq.
The battalion is called Task Force Odin — the name is that of the chief god of Norse mythology, but it also is an acronym for “observe, detect, identify and neutralize.” The task force of about 300 people and 25 aircraft is a Rube Goldberg collection of surveillance and communications and attack systems, a mash-up of manned and remotely piloted vehicles, commercial aircraft with high-tech infrared sensors strapped to the fuselage, along with attack helicopters and infantry.
Read the entire article.
StrategyPage has this (also published June 22) in its Leadership section– a useful reminder:
Critics should not forget that the U.S. Air Force has been the main reason the U.S. has dominated the skies, worldwide, for the last 65 years. That was no accident, it took a lot of effort and imagination. A certain amount of myopia regarding jet fighters, and how to shoot down everyone elses, was necessary to obtain that air supremacy. Without it, winning on the ground is difficult, if not impossible. Let’s not forget that the zoomies are, above all, winners.
Then see my Creators Syndicate column from a couple of weeks ago (June 10, via StrategyPage).
Key point:
Gates’ decision to appoint Gen. Norton A. Schwartz as chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force, however, indicates Gates used a nuke to win a battle in the Pentagon’s turf war among the war-fighting services — a complex, often opaque and long-lived problem that makes war-winning more difficult and costly.
And:
The biggest turf war, however, is over Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) like the Predator and an emerging fleet of “strike” UAVs that can handle traditional bomb and close air support (CAS, supporting ground forces) missions. The Air Force wants UAV operators to be pilots. The Army has found young soldiers familiar with video games can fly UAVs.
The UAVs are a sensor and weapons system that conflicts with current organizational structures…
UAVs are forcing organizational adaptation. The technology escapes current turf boundaries. Recall US military aircraft were once part of the Army Signal Corps.
UPDATE: See this, via nationalmuseum.af.mil.
Excerpt:
The Wright 1909 Military Flyer became the first military heavier-than-air flying machine. Upon purchase by the Signal Corps for $30,000 on Aug. 2, 1909, the U.S. Army designated the Wright 1909 Military Flyer as Signal Corps Airplane No. 1, and it remained the only Army airplane for nearly two years.
The display craft at the museum is a reproduction — a superb reproduction.
Air support should be parceled out like artillery, some local service under the local commander just as 81 and 120 mm mortars are provided to local company and battalion CO’s. This support should be provided by small uav’s and armed crop duster STOL type aircraft, not super expensive helo’s. (Anybody dared to figure out the cost per kill on these support missions?, I have a nagging thought that if we just dropped the money as bribes we’d get better results..)
Better, the UAV should designate the target, and a guided artillery round (from pieces dedicated and slaved to the UAV) used to take it out.
Best- take the target out in a way that doesn’t leave gory pictures for enemy propaganda to exploit (focused non kinetic energy?).
It is absurd, and an ultimately a losing tactic, to mount a multi million dollar operation against one raghead burying an IED. One of the lessons of Vietnam was that we needed to stop sending multi million dollar airplanes to take out thousand dollar trucks on the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
The air force should stick to air supremacy and larger, longer range support missions, especially those requiring coordination theatre wide….(I love being able to write all those “shoulds” I can hardly wait for the “I told you so’s”) J
Comment by Jordan — 6/23/2008 @ 8:36 am
This is certainly not new. When I was in the Army just after Vietnam, veterans told the tale of the Army’s C-7 Caribou aircraft. The Army used these to support remote bases in Vietnam, but the USAF complained that they were in violation of the Key West agreements on roles and missions. The Army turned them over to the USAF, then had to close several bases because the USAF refused to fly into some areas and conditions the Army operated in routinely.
Then came the A-10. A very good CAS airplane, one the Army loves. It was designed and built based on lessons learned in Vietnam. It flies low and slow, where the pilot can see what he’s shooting at, and what he’s not shooting at, and has the endurance to stick around and support the ground commander. It carries weapons tailored to the ground support role. The USAF tried to get out of fielding it, and has tried several times to retire it. I remember one argument during the ’80s when the USAF postion was the laughable statement that the F-16 could do the mission just as well. In the ’90s the Army said that if the USAF wanted to retire the A-10s for budget reasons that the Army would happily take them over and put Warrant Officer pilots up as CAS. The USAF backed off. Fortunately the magnificent performance of those aircraft in the hands of AF reservists during the first Iraq war has kept them off the chopping block since that time.
The argument over ownership of UAVs is just more of the same. Our E-5s are doing just fine as UAV “pilots”. We don’t need guys who trained on the F-16 to fly an aircraft that’s more like (as noted) a video game. The USAF’s arguments on deconfliction of airspace are wholly transparent. Just as with the attack helicopter, the Army has taken the lead and exploited technology to develop a capability that enhances the effectiveness of the ground unit. Jealous of the attention and funding the UAVs are getting, the USAF wants the mission, not for the mission, but for the funding and attention.
The point about the USAF providing air superiority is certainly valid. That’s something they know more about and can do better than anyone else on the planet. But when it comes to any portion of support of the ground troops, it seems much more important to the USAF to win the “turf war” than it does to win the actual ground war.
p.s. The article notes the “commercial aircraft with high-tech infrared sensors strapped to the fuselage.” The RC-12 has been in the Army inventory as a recon and intelligence-gathering aircraft for over 30 years (in addition to the vanilla VIP transport C-12 version) I think if the reporter had the background in Army Aviation necessary to understand TF Odin, he’d see that this is just a repackaging of mostly existing assets to meet the new mission environment.
Comment by Cap'n Dan — 6/23/2008 @ 9:34 am
“Air support should be parceled out like artillery, some local service under the local commander just as 81 and 120 mm mortars are provided to local company and battalion CO’s. ”
Well.
The US Army discovered awhile ago (Kesserine, where Rommel humiliated them) that “parceling out” airpower was probably the least effective way to employ an asset that could cross Division and Corps boundaries at unparalleled speeds to bring decisive power to bear where the operational commander needed it most. Patton understood centralized control and decentralized execution–the core tenet of modern-day airpower employment–to the extent that he deferred to his air commander (”Pete” Quesada) in putting force where it was needed most IAW the OVERALL (emphasis on this last word) scheme of maneuver and commander’s intent.
As far as “armed crop dusters” are concerned, you first, kemosabe. That’s like saying soldiers would fight better if they weren’t so weighted down with kevlar and body armor. The implication that bribery is involved in designing rotary and, by implication, fixed-wing CAS aircraft that include some kind of protection for the operator doesn;t deserve a response. It does, however, reflect the attitude of the one who wrote it. Glad he’s not responsible for the lives of others. At least I hope he isn’t…but I digress.
As far as Vietnam tactics are concerned, no Service was more frustrated by the sometimes counterintuitive guidance from on high–both outside AND inside the Air Force (those who know “Three Fingered Jack” Ryan, know). In fact, as weapons and delivery systems improved in the late 60s and early 70s, those interdiction missions involved some remarkable successes. Was the Army privy to some pretty good CAS support? Well, the guys who were there say they were.
UAVs are an airplane. Guys who spend their entire careers designing, procuring and flying them seem, for some silly reason, to want to be in charge of most of them. Should they be? Maybe. Maybe not. But it may interest you to know that the Predator was armed thanks to an Air Force guy who rammed it down the contractor’s throat, overcame both institutional and corporate inertia and deployed a formidable tool in a much shorter time than anyone expected.
Finally, rolling the Air Force back under the Army is about as smart as putting Ma Bell in charge of Microsoft. Pig, meet wristwatch. What surprises me is how little the Army is interested in controlling the Navy’s SSN Tomahawk assets. After all, those systems support land campaigns, do they not? How about subsuming the Marine Corps under the Army (or, at the very least, their air arm, which pretty much is a CAS-oriented force, anyway). I envy the RAF–the UK seemed to get it from the beginning that people who concentrate on one of the three (soon to be four) media militaries operate in should be the primary drivers of operations in those media. Soldiers know land warfare best. Sailors know surface and subsurface maritime operations best. And airmen know best how to employ air forces better than anyone I’ve ever witnessed. I just wish we could put this Army Air Corps BS to bed.
Comment by Instapilot — 6/23/2008 @ 9:39 am
Interesting blog and comments.
I rejoined to become a UAV pilot. But with what is going on with the Air Force (who seem to have a stigma for females in this area) the Army was the only way to do it and get into any kind of program. As I do not have love for the Air Force at this moment in time, but do think the Navy and the Marines are doing a fine job concerning UAS’s, I think it is interesting how the Air Force has been putting UAS’s and their people on the back burner. The Air Force has been such the “pretty boy” network for so long it was about to get a whooping on.
I am also looking into buying a UAS, but no one has any clue how much red-tape you have to get through for a “little girl or guy” to obtain one of these. And that is what the companies need to realize to stay afloat.
But then, most Prior, Veteran or Currently in the Military either hate UAV’s or love them. I just want to fly them! Screw those who can’t get past who does what in which military branch. We all need to work together on this.
Comment by upinak — 6/23/2008 @ 10:19 am
I understand the bruised feelings of large ego’d zoomies who have a hard time accepting that perhaps the AF is not perfect, but I think it is pretty much incontrovertible that there could be significant improvements in the way they conduct CAS. Perhaps the pilots would be happy to do more. Maybe the blame lies with a leadership that is primarily interested in what is sexy and not in what really needs to be done. We don’t need F-22s in Iraq. The fight is on the ground and the air support needs to be what the ground pounders require. I cannot imagine that the guys on the ground have created their own little air fleet because they have an agenda to roll the AF back into the Army. They have a legitimate need and it was not being supported, so they figured out how to do it themselves. End of story.
Final comments regarding Instapilot: If you cannot see the difference between employment of Tomahawks and CAS, I suggest you go back to school. I am surprised you bring up the MC, which has its own air arm so it does not have to rely on the AF. Doesn’t exactly bolster your case.
Comment by wpw — 6/23/2008 @ 10:38 am
There have always been rivalries between the services. But to a point me thinks the Army protest too much. The Army won the round many years ago that the helicopter though used by all the services is a primary domain of the Army. Since that time the chopper has become the forward assault weapon of choice for them. Evidence of that fact — When the first salvos of Desert Storm launched it was gun ships that did the doing. So I don’t know if the gripe against the airforce is as meaningful as one might expect.
But I think the article misses a key point — UAV’s are going to be a multi service weapon. It is going to range from large ones like the X45 as a pilotless air superiority fighter to hand launched recon UAV’s for platoon level eyes in the sky purposes. The various services would be better served to funnel their needs and thoughts in regards to UAV’s to look for commonality of components to DARPA. Those R&D costs then can be spread back across the entire fleet of UAV aircraft. Things like microsensors, autonavigation, control systems, etc should be shared. The airframe, armament and purpose can be specific to what each service branch needs.
Comment by JohnMc — 6/23/2008 @ 10:46 am
First of all, instapilot, I don’t think anyone here wants to put the USAF back under the Army. Second, I think you misunderstand the comment in the article about bribery. Third, the admittedly expensive Apache is not the only helo in the fight - the small and inexpensive OH-58D Kiowa Warrior is doing yeoman work. They get in close - KW pilots I’ve heard from tell me their most effective weapon is the M-4 carbine fired out the door. The point you seem to miss in the discussion is the distinction between CAS and strategic airpower. I understand your comment about the Tomahawk was meant to be sarcastic, but it’s illustrative. The Tomahawk is clearly a strategic asset. You don’t fire artillery from 500 miles away unless you can’t get closer.
As to bombers, the B-52 is only useful now as CAS due to precision weapons. It was only rarely used as tactical airpower in Vietnam, the notable exception being Khe Sanh, where B-52 strikes literally buried the attacking NVA units. The Army’s favorite CAS aircraft in Vietnam was the A-1 Skyraider - low and slow, with long endurance. The A-10 is its clear successor. The fastmovers brought big hardware, but their accuracy was questionable, especially without direction from a FAC in a (low and slow) O-1, and they usually couldn’t stick around long.
Air superiority and strategic bombing are clearly USAF territory. Support of the ground fight seems to be something they only get interested in when the Army grabs the ball and finds a way to do it better.
I applaud the Secretary’s choice for the new USAF Chief of Staff. When I heard that he came from Special Ops, I knew we’d be getting somebody who at least understands that in the current war he’s there to support the ground fight, not argue with those fighting it over who does what.
Comment by Cap'n Dan — 6/23/2008 @ 11:00 am
Disclaimer - 24+ years with the USAF, the last five in a Headquarters level position working C4ISR issues (working side by side with the ‘midwives’ that helped ‘birth’ and ‘raise’ the Predator and Global Hawk programs).
Instapilot’s observations on the theater (and beyond) flexibility of airpower are spot on, but for some in our beloved sister service, it’s a lesson that they failed to grasp, which is almost unbelievable considering the array of beyond line of sight assets available to a Theater CINC from all of the services, and the daily, routine usage of said assets irregardless of FLOTS, FEBAS, Corps Areas, Lanes of attack, or any other artificial line on a map.
It boils down to two basic tasks, whatever service you’re affiliated with - find, identify, and fix the target; then direction and application of appropriate fires for the desired results. And while there is a tremendous amount of discussion that needs to continue on the details of the procedures used to do this, getting into urinary olympics over who ‘owns’ the pink slip on a given piece of hardware, and writes the performance reports for the individuals that operate it is a parochial distraction, at best.
After my retirement, I’ve had the distinct pleasure of working with two pretty impressive groups of people - the first consisted of people fresh back from literally the bleeding edge of the War on Terror in Afghanistan, tasked with the authority and latitude to press for procedural and doctrinal changes within the Air Force to ensure the timely and seamless availability of air power to the troops in contact. Providing supporting fires - in the form of the B-52 ‘truckload ‘o bombs’ to fast movers, from the TACP and Joint Observer on the ground to the man at altitude with his finger on the pickle button. With the objective of getting the right support directly to the people that need it, when they need it, and how they need it. A lot of words to describe the ability to make the right things go ‘boom’ on command, every time. With the side effect of adding insult to the perceived injury to the carping mid-level Army command elements, by pressing to have them be reduced to merely rubber stampers for field support requests (particularly below the Corps level), with the ‘action’ actually taking place as a direct interaction between the aviator(s) providing the support and the guys on the ground directing and receiving the help - sans some monkey in the middle. The second group of was as dedicated and professional a group of military officers and enlisted as you’ll find in the universe - a Reserve Combat Operations Squadron, the guys that operate the Air Operations Center. Through them, I was fortunate to get a first hand look at the evolving translation of the concepts put forth by the first group, mixed with ‘real world’ lessons learned from actually fighting the war. Despite claims to the contrary from those feeling shorted for one reason or another, integrated pre-planning to have assets available when and where needed for ground attack/close air support/airborne delivered fires to support the ‘pop up’ requirements of a fluid and often murky battlespace.
Based on all of this, I am forced to discount claims by disenchanted ground pounders that their needs are the furthest thing from the minds of the boys and girls in blue. From where I was sitting, it was THE central topic.
Now, while I could weigh in on observations and criticism of the particulars of the way the Air Force manages it’s personnel actions, and believe there is some credence to the complaint that a rated flyer is necessary to operate unmanned beasties of various types and uses, people will continue to disagree over which is better, happy or glad, and the topic is really a distraction from the central discussion.
Does this mean that the Army shouldn’t be involved with developing and employing ISR UAVs and/or armed UAVs, or have their own separate Recce assets (the Guardrail and follow on systems have their pros and cons, strengths and weaknesses) - they should, for the simple reason that more tools is always better than fewer. But when it comes down to the squabble about Administrative control, versus Operational control, versus Tactical control - please. While there probably is room for improvement as new capabilities and equipment is fielded, the bottom line is that once the dance gets started, it doesn’t really matter who pays the bills to change the oil and tires, but that the equipment is effectively employed in a coherent, overall, theater and national level coordinated effort. And for all the squealing about wanting their own set of shiny (or not so shiny) toys to organize, train, equip, deploy, house and feed in the field, because they’re all going to be orchestrated by and through the authority of one guy - the Air Component Commander; who, by the way, works directly for the theater CINC.
Is that the best way to run the railroad? Maybe, maybe not. But it’s a damned sight better than some beauracratic balkanization of assets just because some Army guys want more stuff to be in charge of.
TW: Fouling out - the general gist of most of the “but I wanna be in charge of it” demands I’ve heard. . .
Comment by Wind Rider — 6/23/2008 @ 12:04 pm
Wow, I really need to proofread my drivel before I hit submit. . .
Hope the gist of my argument isn’t lost in the grammatical wasteland above.
ED NOTE: Don’t sweat it. Excellent discussion. Having been in numerous TOCs, JOCs, and AOCs, (and trained with FACs — got to call in Italian GY-91 strikes in a 1976 training mission) I know from personal experience getting airpower to help the ground guys (like me) is a USAF priority. UAVs, however, do test the current organizational templates. They are also comparatively cheap. FWIW, I was impressed with an unclassified briefing I received last year that included an F-22 “deep mission” scenario — the two F-22s were going in with a flock of fast UAVs (some RPV, some robotic). The “strike package” made sense, so did the assumptions presented behind enemy air defenses. USAF mission? I’d say so, and say so unequivocally. The UAVs in the mix were configured for air superiority, deep strike, and electronic (and now that I think about it, decoy). But then we move to CAS. In my column I mentioned how groundpounders love A-10s, AC-130s, and B-52s (BUFFs with precision munitions). I think everyone agrees on the A-10 saga — at least some powerful members of the fighter mafia preferred something called the A-16. That sent a message groundpounders read as a negative.
Comment by Wind Rider — 6/23/2008 @ 12:11 pm
I can’t provide many details, but while the Army has been screaming that it needs the Air Force’s UAVs, it simultaneously pulled most of its UAV units out of CENTCOM. The Air Force has been pushing hard to cover the gaps created by this unilateral Army decision. I’ve been watching this for a few months and wondering if the Army has sought to artificially create a “crisis” in a bid to get joint UAVs under its control in order to screw the Marines.
Here’s a little background. Congress, in various acts, has designated some systems as “joint” and others as “service”. Joint assets, while part of one service, is required to support all services. For example, Air Force airlift is “joint” by law. Army, Marine and Navy airlift are “service” designated. As such, those three services rarely - read never - share their airlift aircraft with other services. Now consider the Army proposal a few years back to buy several hundred fixed wing airlift aircraft. Those would have been Army only assets and consequently would never be shared with the other service. The Air Force rightly argued that Congress designated the Air Force as the holder of joint airlift and the plane should be placed in the Air Force. The Army spun that as the Air Force attempting to control Army airlift. The same issue is at play here. Air Force UAVs are “joint”. Army UAVs are “service”. In other words, the Army will not provide an Army UAV to a Marine unit in contact, but Air Force UAVs support everyone equally. If you put the Air Force UAVs into the Army, the Navy and Marines can kiss support from those assets goodbye and that is exactly what the Army is trying to do.
Comment by David — 6/23/2008 @ 8:53 pm
Not a military guy. Just a taxpayer. It seems to me that UAVs will require a wholesale rethinking of military organization. Not just ground support. What roles do airplanes have? How many of them require human presence on board? Ground Support? It seems that function is already being handled by UAVs. Fighter Jets? The F-22 is wonderful, but it is very expensive. A UAV Fighter would not need life support systems and might be able to maneuver at far higher Gs than a manned craft. Aircraft carriers? They are very big targets. If they used UAVs perhaps they could smaller and cheaper. Separate services? How does that benefit me, the taxpayer?
Like I said. Lots of rethinking.
Comment by Fat Man — 6/23/2008 @ 10:13 pm
USAF is not trying to take over all UAVs. Just as the Army has little airlifters (cargo planes) and little reconnaissance, along with attack aircraft with relatively little payload, the AF is happy to let the Army have little UAVs, as long as they stay below 3,500 feet above ground level. If it’s small and close to the ground, it doesn’t interfere so much with airplanes. If it flies up where the other airplanes are, it needs to be worked into the airspace control regime, so it doesn’t do near misses on expensive airplanes with expensive pilots in them. People think of the air as big and wide open, but when the objects in it move really fast, and can’t just slow down and hover, you really have to pay attention to how they stay apart. If the USAF knows where all the UAVs are flying, it can keep them from crossing the flight paths of all the other aircraft up there.
And related to the Kasserine Pass discussion above, the Army wanted to buy lots of predator UAVs, and give one tenth of the force to each division commander. Kind of like the way they misused airpower against Rommel. The UAVs would deploy with the division or not at all, and one division’s UAVs would not be available to the division next door. The AF said that with the same number of UAVs, they could put maybe two thirds in theater whenever anyone asks, for as long as anyone wants. And, of course, they would be joint assets, like nearly everything flown by the USAF. Available to all services fighting in a theater, sent by the theater air component commander where ever needed most, and not under the thumb of any one division commander.
Comment by Doctor Weasel — 6/24/2008 @ 6:16 am
There is nothing as beautiful to a ground guy as watching the Air Force plaster a target that’s been tough to take out. Nothing. That being said, the trick today is to get anything flying to immediately support the guy in contact. In our current case, this usually means a platoon leader in a fight with an enemy single or a small team. The frustration is with the multiple layers of AF control, and the layers of Army control, and the ‘clearance of fires’ drill. Don’t care how we solve it, and less interested in Rommel, Congress, or Billy Mitchell. But that platoon leader should enjoy every bit of power this nation can deliver to him in the middle of a fight.
Comment by P3Ancient — 6/26/2008 @ 11:20 am