More on the dire diplomatic aftermath of Russo-Georgia War
As I write this post news reports claim Russian troops have halted their main attack just short of Tbilisi, Georgia’s capital. Perhaps Russian memories of the battle for the city of Grozny, Chechnya, play a role. In late 1994 the Russians attempted to drive Chechen rebels from Grozny, and failed miserably. The city fight became a brutal war on the Chechen people instead of a fight with rebels. Georgia lacks Russia’s vast arsenal of tanks and aircraft. However, Georgian infantrymen are experienced, well-armed, and motivated, and the “closed-terrain” of cities gives quality infantry an advantage.
But perhaps not. As I wrote in a previous post, to influence European political, economic or military action, Russia has three convincing tools: (1) nuclear weapons; (2) a veto in the UN Security Council; and (3) abundant natural gas shipped to Europe via pipelines. Russia also controls a chunk of Georgia proper, as well as South Ossetia and (probably) Abkhazia– so it isn’t the ghost of Grozny that stops the tanks, rather, the military has taken what the Kremlin thinks it needs. The territorial gains are diplomatic chips. Ukraine’s strong support for Georgia is a huge plus for Georgia.
The coming days will provide more details about the complicated military situation. In a hot war military halts and initial ceasefires are iffy. The phrase “the situation remains in flux” describes the uncertainty and also covers the scramble by commanders to secure a road junction or a slightly higher ridge. The situations in South Ossetia and Georgia’s other separatist region, Abkhazia, are also highly uncertain and as reports of fighting and maneuvering continue to appear. I just heard that the ceasefire deal will or maybe or could include a pullback by Russia to “pre-war” lines. Hmmm. We’ll see.
Now a complex and dire diplomatic and political aftermath is upon us. Transdniestr is simmering –that’s the separatist region of Moldova I mentioned in the “Kosovo Precedent” post (see above).
Reuters lede:
CHISINAU, Aug 12 (Reuters) - Leaders of Moldova’s separatist Transdniestria region said on Tuesday they would break off all contacts with the ex-Soviet state’s central government until it denounced Georgian “aggression” in South Ossetia.
Transdniestria’s Russian-speaking leaders split from Moldova in 1990 in Soviet times on the grounds that the republic’s Romanian-speaking majority would join neighbouring Romania.
That never happened — but the two sides fought a brief war in 1992 and a resolution has yet to be found.
See this review of Tom Nichols’ book, Eve of Destruction, and his “global jungle outcome” where “great powers will increasingly grant to each other the exceptional right to use violence as they will”– because of the inadequacy of international institutions. I wonder if one long-term effects of the Russo-Georgia War will be to re-energize the Community of Democracies concept.
Given the reports of cyber attacks on Georgian digital systems, (and here, too,) the international lawyers need to look at what constitutes an act of war — a subject I address here.
Attack a nation’s highways and railroads, and you’ve attacked transportation infrastructure. You’ve also committed an obvious, recognized act of war.
An electronic attack doesn’t leave craters or bleeding human casualties, at least not in the same overt sense of an assault with artillery and bombs. However, the economic costs can be much larger than a classic barrage or bombing campaign.
Of course Georgian airfields and highways were hit by bombs, but the cyber attacks disrupt communications and economic activity, very much like cutting a railroad and knocking down the telegraph wires did in the US Civil War.
And there is also the problem of considering how much effort Russia will use to protect ethnic Russians in some of the other former republics. Latvia and Estonia have over 25% and The Ukraine has a little over 17% of its population claiming Russian ethnicity. Luckily, or the benefits of spreading democracy, none of those countries currently have much more than a few small groups claiming to be mistreated and in need of reabsorption.
Is this event unigue or should we regard Russian foreign policy from this point on as revanchist and act accordingly. A slight aside in that attacks against communication networks have generally been considered belligerent. Such as the USN switching to plain language radio reports on German naval movements, which would obviously benefit the British and French, as early as late 1939. Germany certainly considered this hostile as traditionally neutral parties did not give out information on the movement of belligerent forces. Russia I suppose, because because Georgia declared a state of war on the 8th, could consider any aid the US gave to Georgia as hostile acts.
Comment by Pat Patterson — 8/13/2008 @ 2:47 am
Given the terms of the armistice: a return to positions before the war and Condi Rice’s talk of Georgian territorial integrity I’d say Russia got handed its ***.
It is the old trick of a fighting retreat against the spearhead to get the other side extended and then moving in for a counter stroke on the tail. You trade territory for position. American mobile warfare tactics.
I believe Russia decided to quit before the counter stroke could be applied. At least it looks that way if you consider the terms of the armistice.
ED NOTE: Great comment and fine alternative read. What would the Georgians use for the counter-stroke? As I wrote this post I was watching a tv report from the corner of my eye that showed some abandoned Georgian APCs– on a highway. They had unopened ammo boxes on the deck. Okay, very anecdotal. Shortly thereafter a tv clip ran showing Russian air attacks, oh, 25 kms north of Tblisi? Seemed fairly uncontested, like, no flak at all– thought ran through my mind that air defenses there had been suppressed. Again, anecdotal. Maybe, maybe not, very impressionistic. But Georgia was also calling for a ceasefire — a fact, not an impression. Would the counter-stroke you forsee involve Georgian allies? Now that follows a different time line, doesn’t it — which is what I addressed in my column. The column (out on Aug 13) took this post, reconfigured it a bit, maybe a lot, then pointed out: “There are and will be opportunities for diplomatic initiatives that protect Georgia and its democracy. Diplomacy will be intricate and may include this painful prospect: “revisiting” the status of ethnic Serb communities in northern Kosovo.” No, didn’t say military, but does say protect. I think it’s obvious I respect Georgia’s military — still an operational counter-stroke at the Russian penetration struck me yesterday (Aug 12, when I put up the post) as a reach. Pullback to defensible terrain and wait for the attacker to make a mistake– and everyone always makes mistakes. I saw the Gerogians doing that, which you do as well. But let’s see. We don’t have the intel. But then intel is always a bit suspect, isn’t it?
Comment by M. Simon — 8/13/2008 @ 5:10 am