Austin Bay Blog

This morning StrategyPage ran an update on the Sudan peacekeeping mission.

The peacekeeping force data (from StrategyPage):

On March 24 the UN Security Council voted to send peacekeeping troops to help enforce the south Sudan peace agreement. UN Security Council Resolution 1590 authorized the 10,000 military peacekeepers recommended in February. The peacekeeping operation will be called The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). It is conceivable that the south Sudan peacekeeping force could “assist” African Union peacekeepers in Darfur, although some UN officials are talking openly of UN peacekeepers getting involved in Darfur. But UNMIS’ first mission is to monitor and verify the southern ceasefire agreement. It will also help demobilize “ex-combatants” (presumably SPLA guerrillas). The Security Council’s peacekeeping mandate relies on Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which is more “aggressive” than Chapter 6. Most peacekeeping ops are run under Chapter 6, but after the continuing troubles in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, the Security Council may have decided to give the Sudan mission more immediate authority to use force.

There will also be a sizeable civilian police contingent (of up to 715 policemen). Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Tanzania, Turkey, Sri Lanka and Sweden will supply police officers in the Sudan effort.

How long will it take to put the 10,000 troops and 715 police in the field? The UN said “several months.” That’s fair– if several means six or more. The UN report acknowledged logistical difficulties. However, the logistics net in south Sudan can supply the 10,000 troop contingent– there are roads and airfields that can be improved. Darfur is another matter.

The UN said the 10,000 peacekeeping troops will be provided by Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Cambodia (about a company), Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, Denmark, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Rumania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, Ukraine, Uruguay, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

This large multi-national force starts off with a huge command and control challenge– a euphemism for huge problem.

Chapter 7 was used in August 1990, when the UN Security Council passed Resolution 660 –calling for Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait. (It’s actually be used several times, but that is a memorable use.)

Chapter 6 relates to the “pacific” settlement of disputes (”peacekeeping” in the sense that the parties involved seek peace or mediation). Chapter 7 addresses “ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION.” This is really “peace enforcement” (or as I’ve argued in the past, “peace creation”). StrategyPage speculates that the use of Chapter 7 is spurred by the current experience in the DRC — and that may well be the case. The other, equally obvious possibility, is the Sudanese government’s utter disregard for peace monitoring activities in Darfur.

This is from the UN’s own site:

Peacekeeping was created to respond to conflicts between states. Former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskj?ld famously described peacekeeping as characterising ‘Chapter VI ?’ of the Charter; that is, lying somewhere between peaceful (Chapter VI) techniques, such as mediation and fact-finding missions, and more robust (Chapter VII) methods, including military intervention. Throughout the Cold War period, these ?traditional? peacekeeping operations by and large adhered to strict principles of the consent of the parties to the presence of a UN mission, political impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence.

Note that the Sudan peacekeeping mission is another response to a conflict within a state (not between states).

Which leads to a point made in this article from the The Air Force Law Review :

The final customary norm of UN classical peacekeeping is that the use of force is restricted to self-defense. UN Charter Article 2(1) recognizes “the sovereign equality of all of its Members” [85] and Article 2(7) [86] restricts the UN from intervening in state domestic matters, except during Chapter VII enforcement actions. [87] Although the UN Charter does not explicitly address the use of armed force in a classical peacekeeping operation, nor provide any rules or guidelines, [88] authorized use of force in a classical peacekeeping operation is generally limited to self-defense. Further, the use of force must be proportional to the situation. [89]

Although peacekeeping operations use professional military personnel, they generally do not envisage combat as the means to mission accomplishment. In this regard, Chapter VI peacekeeping is clearly distinguished from Chapter VII peace-enforcement combat operations. Classical peacekeeping is founded on consent of the parties to the conflict. Since the parties have consented to the presence of the peacekeepers, the need to resort to force is greatly diminished. As a result, classical peacekeepers are generally only equipped with weapons for use in self-defense. [90] As explained by William Durch, “[p]eacekeepers may be armed, but only for self-defense; what constitutes appropriate self-defense will vary by mission, but because they are almost by definition outgunned by the disputants they are sent to monitor, any recourse to force must be calibrated to localize and diffuse, rather than escalate, violence.” [91]

When a UN peacekeeping unit resorts to force, its neutrality and its obligations under international law might be legitimately questioned. [92] Restricting the use of force to self-defense attempts to ensure that the UN peacekeepers remain impartial to the conflict and do not take sides. Peacekeepers can maintain a presence in a country only if the country gives its consent. If a peacekeeping unit took sides in the conflict, it would, in essence, become a hostile force. The actions, and even the mere presence of such a force, could greatly damage relations with the host-country and easily lead the host-country to withdraw its consent. For this reason, it is imperative that UN peacekeeping units remain impartial and only use force in self-defense. [93]

Here’s a short UN presentation on the legal framework for peacekeeping operations.