Austin Bay Blog

I’m adding this link (via globalsecurity) in response to the commenters and half-dozen emailers who asked about the Senate Intelligence report on Joe Wilson’s Niger expedition. I characterized Wilson NY Times essay as a carnival flim-flam act and I think the evidence supports the conclusion that Wilson lied in that essay–at the minimum lied about the significance of what he learned. Another supportable conclusion is he exaggerated — but exaggerated a great deal after the invasion of Iraq. CIA said Wilson never filed a written report. Wilson was debriefed by two CIA debriefers and the debriefing took place in his own home with his wife (Ms Plame/Mrs Wilson) acting as the hostess. Did she serve coffee? Tea? Bourbon?

Note in the second paragraph Mrs. Wilson tells the committee what she told her husband before he went to Niger:

The former ambassador’s wife told Committee staff that when CPD decided it would like to send the former ambassador to Niger, she approached her husband on behalf of the CIA and told him “there’s this crazy report” on a purported deal for Niger to sell uranium to Iraq.

Were minds made up in advance?

Mrs. Wilson is quoted as telling CIA:

. The CPD reports officer told Committee staff that the former ambassador’s wife “offered up his name” and a memorandum to the Deputy Chief of the CPD on February 12, 2002, from the former ambassador’s wife says, “my husband has good relations with both the PM [prime minister] and the former Minister of Mines (not to mention lots of French contacts), both of whom could possibly shed light on this sort of activity.”

Paragraph 3 (brackets with open spaces indicate deleted classified material):

The former ambassador had traveled previously to Niger on the CIA’s behalf [ ] . The former ambassador was selected for the 1999 trip after his wife mentioned to her supervisors that her husband was planning a business trip to Niger in the near future and might be willing to use his contacts in the region [ ] . Because the former ambassador did not uncover any information about DELETED during this visit to Niger, CPD did not distribute an intelligence report on the visit

The report continues:

When the former ambassador spoke to Committee staff, his description of his findings differed from the DO intelligence report and his account of information provided to him by the CIA differed from the CIA officials’ accounts in some respects. First, the former ambassador described his findings to Committee staff as more directly related to Iraq and, specifically, as refuting both the possibility that Niger could have sold uranium to Iraq and that Iraq approached Niger to purchase uranium. The intelligence report described how the structure of Niger’s uranium mines would make it difficult, if not impossible, for Niger to sell uranium to rouge nations, and noted that Nigerien officials denied knowledge of any deals to sell uranium to any rogue states, but did not refute the possibility that Iraq had approached Niger to purchase uranium. Second, the former ambassador said that he discussed with his CIA contacts which names and signatures should have appeared on any documentation of a legitimate uranium transaction. In fact, the intelligence report made no mention of the alleged Iraq-Niger uranium deal or signatures that should have appeared on any documentation of such a deal. The only mention of Iraq in the report pertained to the meeting between the Iraqi delegation and former Prime Minister Mayaki. Third, the former ambassador noted that his CIA contacts told him there were documents pertaining to the alleged Iraq-Niger uranium transaction and that the source of the information was the [ ] intelligence service. The DO reports officer told Committee staff that he did not provide the former ambassador with any information about the source or details of the original reporting as it would have required sharing classified information and, noted that there were no “documents” circulating in the IC at the time of the former ambassador’s trip, only intelligence reports from [ ] intelligence regarding an alleged Iraq-Niger uranium deal. Meeting notes and other correspondence show that details of the reporting were discussed at the February 19, 2002 meeting, but none of the meeting participants recall telling the former ambassador the source of the report

(U) The former ambassador also told Committee staff that he was the source of a Washington Post article (”CIA Did Not Share Doubt on Iraq Data; Bush Used Report of Uranium Bid,” June 12, 2003) which said, “among the Envoy’s conclusions was that the documents may have been forged because `the dates were wrong and the names were wrong.” Committee staff asked how the former ambassador could have come to the conclusion that the “dates were wrong and the names were wrong” when he had never seen the CIA reports and had no knowledge of what names and dates were in the reports. The former ambassador said that he may have “misspoken” to the reporter when he said he concluded the documents were “forged.” He also said he may have become confused about his own recollection after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported in March 2003 that the names and dates on the documents were not correct and may have thought he had seen the names himself. The former ambassador reiterated that he had been able to collect the names of the government officials which should have been on the documents.

(U) The former ambassador told Committee staff that he had no direct knowledge of how the information he provided was handled by the CIA, but, based on his previous government experience, he believed that the report would have been distributed to the White House and that the Vice President received a direct response to his question about the possible uranium deal. He said,

“Whether or not there was a specific response to the specific question the Vice President asked I don’t know for a fact, other than to know, having checked with my own memory when I was in the White House at the National Security Council . . . any time an official who is senior enough to ask that question, that official was, senior enough to have a very specific response. The question then becomes whether the response came back as a telephone call, a non-paper - in other words, talking points - or orally briefed, or a specific cable in addition to the more general report that is circulated.”
( ) The CIA’s DO gave the former ambassador’s information a grade of “good,” which means that it added to the IC’s body of understanding on the issue, ([ ] ). The possible grades are unsatisfactory, satisfactory, good, excellent, and outstanding, which, according to the Deputy Chief of CPD, are very subjective. [ SENTENCE DELETED ]. The reports officer said that a “good” grade was merited because the information responded to at least some of the outstanding questions in the Intelligence Community, but did not provide substantial new information. He said he judged that the most important fact in the report was that the Nigerien officials admitted that the Iraqi delegation had traveled there in 1999, and that the Nigerien Prime Minister believed the Iraqis were interested in purchasing uranium, because this provided some confirmation of foreign government service reporting.

No new information, but not dismissed because Wilson’s report was judged useful in the context of other CIA information and analysis. In other words, Wilson’s report was “smidgen information,” a paint drop, not even a brush stroke, and certainly not decisive. In assembling a comprehensive intelligence analysis (the big picture) every drop helps. But to characterize Wilson’s report as anything other than minor is wrong. However, if you have a political agenda and access to the NY Times editorial page, something can be made of near-nothing (apologies to Shakespeare, there).

The Wilson segment of the Senate report concludes with this:

IC analysts had a fairly consistent response to the intelligence report based on the former ambassador’s trip in that no one believed it added a great deal of new information to the Iraq-Niger uranium story. An INR analyst said when he saw the report he believed that it corroborated the INR’s position, but said that the “report could be read in different ways.” He said the report was credible, but did not give it a lot of attention because he was busy with other things.

(U) DIA and CIA analysts said that when they saw the intelligence report they did not believe that it supplied much new information and did not think that it clarified the story on the alleged Iraq-Niger uranium deal. They did not find Nigerien denials that they had discussed uranium sales with Iraq as very surprising because they had no expectation that Niger would admit to such an agreement if it did exist. The analysts did, however, find it interesting that the former Nigerien Prime Minister said an Iraqi delegation had visited Niger for what he believed was to discuss uranium sales.

(U) Because CIA analysts did not believe that the report added any new information to clarify the issue, they did not use the report to produce any further analytical products or highlight the report for policymakers. For the same reason, CIA’s briefer did not brief the Vice President on the report, despite the Vice President’s previous questions about the issue.

[( )] On March 25, 2002, the DO issued a third and final intelligence report from the same “[foreign] government service.” The report said that the 2000 agreement by Niger to provide uranium to Iraq specified that 500 tons of uranium per year would be delivered in .

[( )]As in the two previous reports, the government service was not identified as the foreign government service. The foreign government service did not provide the DO with information about its source and the DO, to date, remains uncertain as to how the foreign government service collected the information in the three intelligence reports. There were no obvious inconsistencies in the names of officials mentioned or the dates of the transactions in any of the three reports. Of the seven names mentioned in the reporting, two were former high ranking officials who were the individuals in the positions described in the reports at the time described and five were lower ranking officials. Of the five lower ranking, two were not the individuals in the positions described in the reports, however, these do not appear to be names or positions with which intelligence analysts would have been familiar. For example, an INR analyst who had recently returned from a position as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Niger told Committee staff that he did not notice any inconsistencies with the names of the officials mentioned. The only mistake in any of the reports regarding dates, is that one date, July 7, 2000, is said to be a Wednesday in the report, but was actually a Friday.

This globalsecurity link leads to the entire report.

UPDATE: I see Ed Morrissey had a post up on this yesterday (October 30). Ed Morrissey covers the same material but from a different angle.

Ed adds this observation– and asks an important question. SSCI is the acronym for Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (whose Wilson/Plame testimony this post quotes).

For those who think the SSCI got it wrong, the indictment of Scooter Libby makes it clear that Plame got Wilson the mission to Niger (page 4, points 6 & 7, h/t CQ commenter ROA). The only argument that has come out from anyone saying anything different was a Washington Post article from August, which was anonymously sourced. Unfortunately for the “senior CIA officer” serving as that source, the SSCI has in their possession a written memorandum from Plame making the recommendation — which, if you read the post above, you would already know.

Why isn’t Wilson getting charged with lying to Congress in the SSCI investigation? Probably because he knew better than to lie about his assignment while under oath. The SSCI report makes that much clear as well; he admits that the Nigerien PM told him that the Iraqis tried to buy the yellowcake and elides the point about his wife as much as he can without committing perjury. Too bad Scooter Libby wasn’t bright enough to do the same thing.

Great point. I think Libby should be prosecuted for lying to a federal prosecutor and grand jury. Ed suggests “Slick Wilson” didn’t make Slick Willie’s mistake of lying under oath — the crime Libby allegedly committed as well.

Also, a reader sends this link to the report, noting the “additional views” of Senators Roberts, Hatch, and Bond. Thank you.

See pages 441 through 445. On page 445:

The former ambassador, either by design or through ignorance, gvae the American people and, for that matter, the world a version of events that was inaccurate, unsubstantiated, and misleading. Surely, the Senate Intelligence Committee, which has unique access to all of the facts, should have been able to agree on a conclusion that would correct the public record. Unfortunately, we were unable to do so.

Also read the comments on Wilson’s “media blitz.” Wilson appeared on more than thirty television shows. His message was that the administration lied and that his trip to Niger “debunked” the claim that Saddam sought uranium in Africa. You can see from the portion of the Senate report both parties agreed to that Wilson did not debunk the claim about Africa. He may not have “debunked” the claim that Saddam sought yellowcake from Niger.

UPDATE: Gateway pundit has an excellent post on Wilson’s agenda. He quotes a Wilson speech from June 2003.