Austin Bay Blog

Reports like this one from the AP rarely attract headline attention, in part because tribal relationships and the importance of the tribe in Arab societies are either poorly understood or ignored by journalists. Bombs make headlines; family structure is a yawn.

But kudos to the AP for this piece of reporting, which does a superb job of addressing politics, demography, strategy, and violence.

The AP report is written by Antonioa Castaneda. It’s dated December 3 with the dateline Samarra, Iraq. Samarra is very much a Sunni town. Last year (as the article notes) Zarqawi had fighters operating openly in Samarra.

Here’s the background: A local sheik in Samarra was killed, with the likely culprits Saddam’s supporters. As the AP story reports, the assassination produced a “backlash,” one similar to Jordan’s response to Al Qaeda’s terror murder spree in Amman last month.

During the summer of 2004 I attended at least a three-dozen briefings where tribal affiliation was the central subject. The tribal sheiks can (and do) play a key role in distributing aid. The objective is to move from aid to job creation. Two British officers I know stressed the sheiks role in identifying small businesses and local entrepreneurs who would benefit from low-interest loans. I know these types of low-level aid and business-development programs exist. The AP article also mentions a tribal “scout force” operating in western Al Anbar. For two years senior coalition commanders, intelligence officers, and civil affairs representatives have pushed for better cooperation abd liaison with tribes along the Syrian border. Trust is something that is earned, and earning trust takes time.

Key grafs from the AP report:

After keeping their distance for months, Iraqis in this Sunni Arab city suddenly began cooperating with U.S. troops, leading them to insurgents and hidden weapons caches. The reason: anger over the assassination by insurgents of a local tribal chief.

“That’s when they decided to make a stand,” said Capt. Ryan Wylie of Lincoln, Neb., commander of Bravo Company, 3rd Battalion, 69th Armored Regiment. “They definitely had an idea of the terrorists and where they hang out.”

U.S. commanders cite other reasons for a lull in violence in this city 60 miles north of Baghdad. They include construction of an 11-mile berm around the city to block gun runners and a greater reliance by the military on covert monitoring positions.

But almost everyone agrees that the biggest reason for the reduction in violence here was the public backlash against the insurgents after the Oct. 11 assassination of Sheik Hikmat Mumtaz al-Bazi, chief of one of the area’s seven tribes.

The report adds:

The reason for the killing remains unclear. Some say he was targeted for working with U.S. forces. Others believe he was killed because of a contract dispute over a U.S.-funded project. Most agree that the sheik’s American connection cost him his life.

“They killed him to send a message that you can’t be working with coalition forces,” said Lt. Col. Mark Wald, commander of the 3rd Battalion. “I think they were trying to rein him back in.”

Tribalism is deeply rooted in Iraqi society and adds a dimension to the insurgency that outsiders find difficult to understand. Some tribes support the insurgency, while others back the government. In many cases, tribes are divided in their loyalties.

This is a telling quote:

“It really speaks to the potential this city has when tribesmen get fed up and take action against terrorists,” said Lt. Nathan Adams of Savannah, Ga. “It’s as simple as one tribe having something happen to them and motivating them to take action.”

In western Anbar province, also dominated by Sunni Arabs, the Marine command reported tribal fighting last summer between those who supported dealings with the U.S. military and those opposed.

Last month, American forces in Anbar began raising a scout force, known as the “Desert Protectors,” from the ranks of a tribe whose rivals had ties to al-Qaida.