Warning: file_exists() [function.file-exists]: open_basedir restriction in effect. File(/var/www/vhosts/austinbay.net/httpdocs/blog/wp-content/plugins/../../../../../../tmp/sessions/sess82388123.txt) is not within the allowed path(s): (/var/www/vhosts/austinbay.net/httpdocs:/tmp) in /var/www/vhosts/austinbay.net/httpdocs/blog/wp-settings.php on line 346

Warning: include(/tmp/sessions/index.php) [function.include]: failed to open stream: No such file or directory in /var/www/vhosts/austinbay.net/httpdocs/blog/wp-content/themes/classic/index.php on line 2

Warning: include() [function.include]: Failed opening '/tmp/sessions/index.php' for inclusion (include_path='.:') in /var/www/vhosts/austinbay.net/httpdocs/blog/wp-content/themes/classic/index.php on line 2
Austin Bay Blog » UPDATED:Diplomatic Dispatch: Dr. Demarche Says “Loosen The Strings”

Austin Bay Blog

1/26/2006

UPDATED:Diplomatic Dispatch: Dr. Demarche Says “Loosen The Strings”

Filed under: General — site admin @ 9:07 pm

Last week I received a number of emails and comments from several Foreign Service Officers (active and retired) regarding my post on Secretary of State Condi Rice’s “new directions” at State. I wrote about “pro-active” or anticipatory diplomacy — the process of identifying social and political currents, economic prospects, and emerging leaders so that diplomacy could better shape or mitigate circumstances.

Dub that post the first Bay Blog “Diplomatic Dispatch.”

This week, Dr. Demarche offers his thoughts on the subject of “Diplomacy 2020 A.D.” A useful soundbite (that’s an oxymoron) lies at the center of his thoughts on how to create a pro-active State Dept: “Loosen the strings,” Demarche argues.:

Diplomacy 2020 A.D.- can we get there from here?
by Dr. Demarche

I should have remembered that the first rule is always “never volunteer.” Last week Col. Bay replied to a comment left for his post UPDATED: Condi Outlines New State Dept. Skill Requirements by stating:

“I’d like to start a weekly or biweekly “diplomatic exchange” on this site, with readers (FSOs, State Dept economists, developmental aid experts, etc.) highlighting a specific subject area. If “specific subject area” sounds vague, it is vague with intent. Good diplomacy avoids crises. I’d like to explore how the Crises of 2020 can be thwarted or mitigated by savvy and common sense in 2006. ”

I couldn’t resist, and sent him an e-mail saying I’d be glad to participate, which he immediately answered, asking for a post. And so here I am, and I have to say that his challenge is very a tall order to fill.

In recent years it has become fashionable to bash the State Department as being slow to react, focused on the past battles of the Cold War and hostile to the President, if not downright anti-American. I too have engaged in my fair share of poking fun at the State Department, from within, and imagine I’ll have ample opportunity to do so in the future. The Department is an easy target; after all, there is denying that. It is full of odd people who choose to live away from the heartland and as a bureaucracy is indeed slow to react. For decades we focused on a monolithic enemy that no longer exists, and that has been a hard habit to kick On top of that our Foreign Service is by far the largest in the world, comprised of every type of American and governed by a maze of law and policy cobbled together by every administration from that of President Washington to the current President. Our top players change with every incoming White House administration, if not more frequently- management styles and fads (transformational diplomacy, anyone?) come and go faster than the latest pop sensations. Imagine if your boss or the Sr. VP of your firm was appointed regardless of experience or ability because he sold a lot of widgets in Peoria- welcome to the world of the political appointee ambassador and Asst. Secretary of State (some of them, anyway). Our mission statement may sound great, but success is almost impossible to define:

Create a more secure, democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the international community.

Removing Saddam Hussein most likely has made America safer in the long run, but the so called international community is mighty pissed off over the action we took to remove him, for the time being. How do we measure the removal of a tyrant against the ire of the other great nations of the world?

Having said all that, I doubt that you will find a more committed group of Americans outside of the armed forces. The Foreign Service is by design made up of a cross section of America, and every possible idea of what America means and could possibly mean is intended to be represented by those who serve. The conservative side of America is sorely under-represented though, I agree. Hence the Diplomad’s claim to founding the Department of State Republican Underground, which drew me into blogging, first at the Daily Demarche and now at American Future . The lack of a strong conservative voice at State, however, is our fault, that is, the fault of the conservative movement. We have no one to blame but ourselves if our vision of America is not prevalent among our diplomats. The conservative movement in America is largely isolationist after all, and yet we complain when our diplomats do not project our idea of what it means it be American. We should be encouraging more young conservatives to study diplomacy and to take the entry exam for the Foreign Service so that our voices are presented too.

Col. Bay’s overarching question as to how we can avoid the crises of 2020 is a complex one (many of the potential crises of the next decades have probably not even been identified yet), not be answered in a single post. I do have a few suggestions as to how we can make our diplomats more effective in the here and now in the hopes of preparing them for future challenges, though.

The first may seem counter intuitive, but here it is: loosen the strings. We are so tied to Washington , with e-mail, our archaic “cable” system and the telephone that for all intents and purposes our diplomats are hamstrung- no important decision, or even a semi-important decision, is made without consulting Washington. We need to instill the military concept of “small unit action” in our diplomats, and to turn them loose. In battle a general might set the objective to capture a small town as part of a larger strategy, but he does not draw up the assault plan. The authority trickles down to Captains and Lieutenants and NCOs, and when the team leaders hit a snag they are expected to improvise and accomplish the mission. No similar analogy exists at State. Objectives are set by Washington, but at the first sign of trouble the overwhelming response is to ask D.C. for guidance and to do nothing until it comes.

Second, get our diplomats out from behind their desks. CNN and the BBC cover most events more effectively than we can ever hope to- so why are we reporting on industrial accidents and the environment? We have limited resources; a minuscule amount compared to the military- and should focus those as accurately as possible. We spend an obscene amount of time feeding the beast- firing off cables into the abyss, largely regurgitating what the local press has said, perhaps with a comment or two by the “contact” we inherited from our predecessor. These reports, however, are first vetted through a clearance process notorious for being flawed- we call it the “happy to glad” syndrome whereby everyone who touches a document has to make a change. The end result is often bland and devoid of substance. Think writing by committee is easy? Gather four friends and write out the directions for how to make a peanut butter and jelly sandwich- that is how we inform foreign policy.

Our junior diplomats should be working outside the Embassy more than they are inside it, making contacts with the future leaders of the host nation and assisting those who seem amenable to democracy and liberty- and please note the conjunction, there can be no separating liberty from democracy, no matter that the current rally cry is “Democracy on the march.” At the same time we must expend more effort in connecting with the local people where we serve- the “hearts and minds” ideal has to be a large part of every diplomat’s job. What we call Public Diplomacy now is largely a dismal failure, there American public is not involved in it, and the locals get little or no sense of who we are or what we believe in- the State Department has no equivalent to the GI tossing candy to a crowd of children, smiling and posing for photos and shaking hands, and we sorely need to project that image of unfettered optimism and hope. Our Ambassadors and senior diplomats should continue to work with the present leaders and elite of the world, of course, but the battle for their allegiance has largely already been won or lost- our future among the people of the world depends on those who yearn for freedom more than those who control access to it.

Finally, we need a rational, coherent foreign aid policy. Taxpayer dollars should be spent, not given away, and they should buy increased knowledge for the people of the world as to the role the United States plays in their homeland. Every grant should be tied to a measurable goal, from increased literacy among children to so many hospital beds supplied to the local populace- and none of it should be anonymous. Every school built or hospital wing dedicated should be named after Lincoln, or Martin Luther King, or Betsy Ross, or George Washington Carver or any other American of note, with an explanation in the local language carved into the front as to who the namesake was and where the funds came from. When a nation fails to meet an established goal, or otherwise acts in a way that we do not support, the aid should be cut off, and the message should be broadcast to the people who are feeling that loss as to exactly why we have taken such an action, and what their leaders can do to rectify it.

I have used large brush strokes here in attempt to paint the outlines as to what I feel we can do to answer the Colonel’s question- my ideas are not meant to be a panacea to all of our diplomatic woes. I offer them as a starting point, and realize that many may disagree. I welcome countering points of view- we have let these issue lie without discussion for far too long. Is it too late to thwart the crises of the 2020s? I don’t know. But I do know that a very wise man once said “do what you have always done, and get what you have always gotten”, and doubt that many see that as a road to success in the future of American Diplomacy.

Per last week’s post, we’ll continue to solicit thoughts on this subject. Write me via my Creators Syndicate mail box.

UPDATE: This essay by James Na appears at realclearpolitics, January 27.

Key grafs:

Noting that the State Department has almost as many employees in Germany, with a population of 82 million, as those in India, with a population of 1 billion, Secretary Rice announced that as much as a third of Foreign Service positions could be relocated from cushy and coveted European capitals and Washington to China, India and other, presumably less desirable, hot spots of the 21st Century.

The speech was not simply an announcement for a superficial makeover plan for a department long considered archaic. After all, what determines an organization’s priorities is not so much its purported objectives statement, but its promotion criteria. Secretary Rice, indicating her seriousness, declared that only those with regional expertise, fluency in at least two languages (especially “exotic” ones like Chinese, Urdu and Arabic) and willingness to accept dangerous postings would be promoted into senior ranks.

In a classic diplomatic understatement, this transformation is said to be causing “some distress” among the department careerists.

He makes the same point made by several commenters — and me– about vetting political appointees for cultural and linguistic expertise.

Thus, Secretary Rice faces a difficult twin task: that of transforming the outlook and modus operandi of an entrenched Foreign Service bureaucracy, and reforming the way in which the White House supplies political appointees to the former in vital overseas assignments. These political appointments should be screened rigorously for foreign policy effectiveness in addition to the inevitable criteria of political loyalty to, and ideological kinship with, the White House.

12 Comments »

  1. We can’t purchase our way into being loved. We will only end up creating a weird pathological attitude of entitlement. Look at Mexico for instance, posturing about the proposed fence in a way that it violates their right to run a corrupt Leftist autocracy, all the while ushering millions of discontented fellow citizens over the border into gringo land. Pure entitlement. I have a better idea than trying to buy love, how about sporting an attitude of “we don’t give a damn!” You Euro post-moderns don’t like us??????????? GOOD!!! We would feel profoundly troubled if you approved of us. Your approval is reserved for Arab, corpulent voluptuaries, and retrograde, quasi Stalinists. We need you like a wicked hangover. Let those in the world ready to shoulder responsibilities rally to us, let those who won’t go whine and lament amongst themselves.

    Comment by Dan M. — 1/27/2006 @ 12:57 am

  2. Interesting dialog. I think our diplomats really have 2 main goals: 1. cultivate friendly relations with the citizens and the government. This is the ‘hearts and minds’. A short list of how to do this includes: - Throwing money at humanitarian causes (medical equipment, disaster recovery, schools, infrastructure) - Speaking at schools or other places to increase their exposure to the populate more directly - Overtly supporting organizations that want democracy, liberty and equality. I think Dan M. above is effectively saying “money can’t buy you love”, which is true. We’re not looking for love - but compassion for others would drive us to buy a hospital an extra cot for areas which couldn’t afford it. The fact that it might make those in that area view us more favorably shouldn’t deter us. It also better expresses what we as Americans want our country to be doing - and that is being a force for good and aid in the world. 2. cultivating covert contacts so that we can more effectively support democracy, freedom and equality in those countries, and also gather information on plots by those who would attack us or our allies. This coincides with the intelligence agencies, so any reform here can’t be complete without fundamental changes in those agencies as well.

    Comment by Bryan — 1/27/2006 @ 9:34 am

  3. Woah. “Loosen the strings”? I appreciate how much guts it had to take to write that, but Dr. Demarche’s argument boils down to, “Yes, State is filled with left-wing folks who are probably hostile to the President’s foreign policy decisions and willing to forward competing policies at the expense of the President’s policy decisions, but the best way to ensure that the President’s policy is adopted is to…FREE THESE PEOPLE FROM CONSTANT OVERSIGHT.” Now, I understand that it may be a hugely bureacratic waste to engage in the cabling process, but from my point of view which would be worse: 1. State employees committed to undermining the President’s foreign policy are unable to act decisively because they are forced to constantly update DC 2. State employees committed to undermining the President’s foreign policy are able to act, now that they’ve had their strings loosened, and MAYBE they have a better understanding of the correct foreign policy, and MAYBE they are able to implement that policy all by themselves if they have less oversight.

    Comment by Some Guy — 1/27/2006 @ 10:13 am

  4. Dr. Demarche reminds me of my own unofficial survey conducted while living in a pre- and post-9/11 Ireland. During my several years living and traveling throughout the republic I never met a single person outside of government who was aware of the US contributions to the International Fund for Ireland, despite the fact that since 1986 US taxpayers have gifted nearly half a billion dollars to the Fund. As ‘Citizens Against Government Waste’ notes, though the U.S. contribution to the Fund was always to be spent on “those projects that hold the greatest potential for job creation and equal opportunity for the Irish people”, our donations have gone to such things as building one of Europe’s largest indoor leisure and water sports facilities (which leaks significantly), and to the building of a replica of the ‘Jeanie Johnston’, a Canadian ship that once ferried famine victims across the Atlantic. (The project ran into enormous cost over-runs.) Indeed, neither the The National Aquatic Center’s (NAC) nor the Jeanie Johnston’s websites make any reference to American contributions, nor can any reference be found in a search of the archives of Ireland’s various news organs. The NAC website merely states that their project is “funded by the State”. As one of the oldest groups of benefactors of American largesse, the people of Ireland seem to exhibit less and less awareness of where their funding comes from, never mind any idea of how their situation might be other than it is. I believe that it was just such a lack of awareness which contributed to the popular and widespread rejection of American interests during the 2001 war in Afghanistan.

    Comment by T. O'Connor — 1/27/2006 @ 10:19 am

  5. I think Dr. DeMarche is right — we do need to develop the power of the State Department as a force for positive change in the world. Dan’s anger is understandable. State has largely deserved the criticism it’s received, the reasons for which Dr. Demarche hits upon. Sometimes it’s quite unclear just what State is doing and what its objectives are. It would be a breath of fresh air to see the department state more forcefully what its aims are and show some results for how it is getting those objectives achieved. We focus so much on power in terms of what the military can do; yet when it comes to the questions of what will make the world safer in the coming decades, we often neglect the most powerful weapon in our arsenal — the soft power of economic and cultural influence. America is strong for what it is and for what it believes in, and our values resonate with people throughout the world. (At least with the right people.) We should have no shame in promoting our vision of freedom and democracy — something that will be easier to accomplish with more “feet on the ground”, so to speak. Secretary Rice, it seems, is taking the Department in the right direction for this to happen.

    Comment by Matt H. — 1/27/2006 @ 11:07 am

  6. I think Dr. Demarche’s analogy to the military is a good one, but it also sounds like a modified Peace Corp. And I don’t mean that as a criticism. I’m thinking of the Peace Corp of my youth (40 years ago) that made young Americans ambassadors to the world for American ideals and ideas. Peace Corp resources and aid were targeted to specific goals. All in all, I thought it was initially a great program, and I’d like to see the foreign service do something like that, too.

    Comment by DRJ — 1/27/2006 @ 11:34 am

  7. The reason all these donations and fundings are anonymous is: we don’t want to be accused of “imperialistic”. Someone, especially those someone who siphon off these aids to their own pockets would accuse us of imperialistic intent to buy off the local population. These accusations may even originate from our own precious liberal groups. Not every American believes that we are a force for good, and they try their damnest to prove that we are not. There are aready accusations that Bush is politicising USAID by tagging USA on items we donate. Even Bill Gates runs into problems for linking performance to his grants. Officials in countries whose children Gates tries to immunize simply say there is too much paper work, we rather not have our children immunized. The Gates Foundation backs down. Its spokesman said they rather give their money away than have their money accounted for, whether the money is going to the right place is irrelevant. This applies to our foreign aids too. Some bureaucrats’ jobs are on the line if the local strong man refuses help. We value their people as human beings, they value theirs as bargaining chips. Another news: we are still sending aids to the Chinese. Millions of dollars. Recently, some dogooder organizations sent them about eleven millions worth of supplies including old clothes, old medical equipment to help some disadvantaged locality. What happened was: the receipients complained that the supplies were used, Uncle Sam was embarrassed and had to pay eleven million dollars to buy new supplies as replacements. It doesn’t matter that those were private donations, no self respecting Chinese would want to wear old American clothes. US tax payers must pay.

    Comment by ic — 1/27/2006 @ 12:29 pm

  8. Mostly agree with Dr. Demarche’s points here. State is the most bureaucratic agency in the USG. No piece of paper can be promulgated without at least three levels of clearance, more if it’s important. I was initially a USIS officer, brought into State through what I see as a hostile takeover. The “consolidation” definitely gutted PD’s ability to do effective, responsive programming by adding layers and layers of bean-counting and runs-through-the-clearance-mill. One thing that USIS (or USIA, if you’re Washington-centric) did was to empower its officers in the field. They were given budgets and goals (they had a large part in setting those goals). If they met their goals while staying within budget, all was well. Kudos and promotions followed. If they screwed up, they lost the confidence of their bosses and found themselves floating downward through the mire of less and less important posts. Even junior officers could have responsibility for (and authority for) million dollar budgets. If they used them wisely, the nation benefited. Consolidation had further deleterious effects: it put PD in the immediate realm of electoral politics. USIS/USIA’s role was to tell America’s story. That isn’t the White House Incumbent’s story exclusively. It meant that all voices (beyond the obvious quacks) were to be given platforms. America is not the President and it’s not the President’s policies exclusively, though of course those should play a major role. USIS programs do not achieve goals in two-, four-, or six-year cycles. Some programs take 20, 30, 40 years to reach fruition. But under the new covenant, only those programs with immediate payoffs get funded. That is not only stupid, it’s a criminal waste of money and time. If there is a program, no matter how good, that is too closely associated with a previous administration (particularly if it’s the other party’s administration) it must be killed. And then it is usually “re-invented” under a different name with somewhat different structure and rules. All the work spent on the previous program is tossed and the world is created anew. In the meantime, all in-house expertise is lost. In the meantime, all the contacts in the field have been lost. In the meantime, even all the paperwork and enabling legislation is lost. And they all have to be recreated by a new bunch of people. This is not a good use of tax dollars–my and your tax dollars. I will take exception with Dr. Demarche’s seeming disparagement of political appointees. The best ambassadors I’ve worked for have been political appointees, though some career ambassadors were good. The worst ambassadors I’ve worked with were also political appointees, but some were career amabassadors. More than passing a “purity test”, ambassadors should have to pass a psychological test. Some of these guys/women are just plain whacked. State needs to give up its bureaucratic ways. It does need to spread the power deeper into the structure. Yes, that has risks as Some Guy notes. I’ve had trouble getting State offices to cover the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee because they didn’t like his politics. But that means empowering their supervisors to take corrective action that doesn’t include two years’ worth of paperwork. I’d like to see Administrations set broad goals and then leave the diplomats to achieve them, not micromanage every step of the way. Part of the problem is simply the fact that times have changed. When it took six months for Washington’s instructions to reach the ambassador by ship, the ambassador had to do a lot on his own initiative. But when the President can pick up a phone and call a Prime Minister or President–often without even letting his own ambassador know–then the entire dynamic has changed, necessarily. An ambassador–and those officers under him–are tightly circumscribed when someone like a Richard Holbrooke is calling the shots from Washington, or even a mobile phone while traveling to his next flight. I’m not sure that the ideal I suggest can be achieved. That it should be is one matter. But we live in a hyper-politicized world right now. Every action is reported and immediately second-guessed. A slip of the tongue goes global before anyone has a chance to correct it, forget spin it. And Washington is its own worst enemy here, too. State in DC works M-F, 8:30-5:30, with only a few offices active on weekends or holidays. Well, the world is operating 24/7, holidays included. It doesn’t stop just because a DC bureaucrat has done his alloted hours. Many officers work unpaid overtime (funny how that works), but that’s not enough. When someone from NEA is getting into the office in DC, they guys in Riyadh or Oman are clearing their desks to go home. The guys in New Delhi or Singapore are already at home. DC has to work longer hours and more days since they sure aren’t going to find enough people to staff embassies 24/7. Effective diplomacy cannot be had on the cheap.

    Comment by John Burgess — 1/27/2006 @ 2:10 pm

  9. We need more “inside” information such as this. Whether the recommendations have merit is secondary to the insight they provide. Any intelligent businessman would tell you that performance of your organization is tied to your ability to listen to those doing the heavy lifting and implementing their ideas. I may not agree with all of these recommendations but I’m not there and that is the point the author is trying to make. Do I relish the idea of liberal idealogues promoting their agendas unfettered in the international community? No. But their understanding of the issues is far greater than my own and should therefore be given some significant weight. We can continue to argue amongst ourselves about the best way to implement our foreign policy, but we are never charged with the execution. They are. He has urged that more conservatives enter the foreign service. Perhaps this type of Affirmative Action for diversity in political ideals could lead the way towards allowing this type of freedom within the State Dept. I am grateful that this type of feedback is available for us to read, think about, and perhaps act upon. Thank you sir!

    Comment by Kevin — 1/27/2006 @ 7:46 pm

  10. I hope our Secretary of State reads this.

    Comment by Kathy K — 1/27/2006 @ 8:36 pm

  11. Great post, kudos to Dr. Demarche for writing it, to Col. Bay for publishing it, and to all the commenters above for their “two cents.”

    Comment by Consul-At-Arms — 1/28/2006 @ 7:16 pm

  12. And one other thing: registration for the next Foreign Service Written Examination (http://careers.state.gov/officer/), to be given worldwide in April 8, 2006, has already begun. If you think the FS has too many liberals, than JOIN IT! Register online here: http://careers.state.gov/officer/join/examinfo.html

    Comment by Consul-At-Arms — 1/28/2006 @ 7:20 pm

RSS feed for comments on this post. TrackBack URL

Leave a comment

Powered by WordPress