Iraqi National Guard Merges With Iraqi Army
This has been in the works for quite sometime. Last August in Baghdad I discussed the “merger” with an Iraqi National Guard lieutenant. The young man commanded an Iraqi National Guard company that was very much in the “formation and training” phase. “Yes,” he said, “we will be the army. ” When? He didn’t know. The young man had a lot of long 14 hour days–he didn’t have tiime to know. The American captain who was mentoring him didn’t know either– decisions like that were above his pay grade. I guessed it would be within “a year or so.”
Let’s try seven months. From today’s NY Times, by Eric Schmitt, who is an excellent defense reporter:
TAJI, Iraq - In a ceremony at this sprawling Iraqi Army base in early January that drew virtually no attention abroad, the Iraqi military took what American officials say was a pivotal step and a calculated gamble in the effort to defeat the insurgency.
As nearly 100 Iraqi tanks, gun trucks and armored personnel carriers rumbled by a reviewing stand filled with ribbon-bedecked Iraqi and American generals, the interim prime minister, Ayad Allawi, and top Iraqi officers made an announcement: Iraq’s national guard, a regional civil defense force formed less than two years ago, would be merged into the relatively small national army.
The following paragraph, however, is a bit at odds with my own experience:
The original concept of the national guard was to have a modest military ability, largely to help at a local level, without adding those formations to a regular army that might become tempted to carry out a coup.
Based on what I saw and heard while on duty in Iraq, the long-term concept (perhaps not the “original”) was to make the National Guard part of the Iraqi Army. The unanswered issues in mid-2004: Iraqi governmental stability. Another key conditionand was the training level of National Guard forces. In mid-2004 National Guard forces (with a couple of exceptions) were fledglings trying to master the basics.
This next paragraph also gives me cause to pause:
But in fighting the current insurgency, the level of force that even a well-trained guard unit can deliver is inadequate in the view of some field commanders and some Iraqi officials who are pressing for a greatly increased military ability.
Add this paragraph, nestling in the report:
But training and equipping the national guard is fraught with challenges, and converting its units into army forces is a calculated gamble, some American officials say.
Agreed, in war, everything is a “gamble” of sorts, and heaven knows the best gambles are highly calculated. Weighing risks before taking action is an officer’s business– the smart officer minimizes risks. That’s why training Iraqi security personnel has received such emphasis.
I hear percolating in the rhetorical background of this report– just a bit– Gore 2000 and “dangerous scheme” lingo. Is this a faint touch of spin — what Bill Keller assures Jeff Jarvis isn’t in the NY Times?
One implication of “gamble” as a word choice– the training regimen hasn’t been thought through. If that’s the implication, I disagree. Another implication — this merger is a rush job.
Hmm. Possibly. But consider this: last July I heard an Iraqi National Guard brigadier say he wanted more heavy weapons –as I recall, he specifically mentioned more heavy machine guns. He said his troops needed them to be effective. My opinion, which went unexpressed, because I was merely in the audience: At that moment in time his troops needed training and experience to be effective, more than they needed heavy machine guns, mortars, and automatic grenade launchers (though in time, I suspected, his units would receive those weapons). However, no soldier would disagree with the general’s desire to increase his troops’ firepower– as long as they can use the firepower effectively and with discipline. His troops have now had eight months of additional training. It’s not outlandish to conclude they can now crew 32 instead of eight heavy machine guns. (The Times article says Iraqi National Guard battalions will now have 32 heavy machine guns instead of eight.) The US Army taught me to use an M2 fifty caliber machine gun in two days. I got a week’s practice with the M85 fifty caliber (the tank commander’s weapon on the old M60A1 tank). When we went to the range for qualification I hit every fifty caliber target.
I wish The Times’ article had specified what it means by “the current insurgency?” The fight as of last July? This February? April-May 2004 in Karbala? My overall take: We’re seeing the transition to a “new Iraqi Army,” one built to tackle “regional threats” as well as crack the Saddamists. The training regimen –slow and painful as it is– is producing military units who can effectively employ the suite of heavier infantry weapons.
Read the whole thing.
UPDATE: Jim Dunnigan of www.strategypage.com says this in his FYEO-express email of February 24: “The (Iraqi) government has not only put more, and better trained, security forces to work, but more tribes and localities have become active in organizing their own self-defense.”
This suggests local security forces are picking up the local security mission, ie, what the Times says the National Guard was handling.
UPDATE: The “Iraqi bulldog” (ie, a militarily strong and assertive Iraq allied with the US) is discussed in my article, “The Mlliennium War,” which appeared in the Weekly Standard’s January 3, 2005 issue.
When I took a job training kuwaiti soldiers to become tank crewman on M1A2s the conventional wisdom of my employer was that at best we could create something that looked like a tank outfit, but they’d only be minimally capable and not up to US standards. The crews that I trained over a two year period did their tank crew qualifications at a level equivalent to US crews, scorewise. We also were able to accomplish such esoteric items as the use of their radios in full secure/frequency hopping mode for both voice and data, something else that the Detroit CW said wasn’t possible. I suspect that the Iraqi soldier is at least as trainable as his Kuwaiti counterpart. The main thing holding back effective militaries in that part of the world to me is the fear that an effective military is a standing threat to the regime. If obedience to political control can be hammered in early I don’t see any showstoppers to building an effective Iraqi military. Glubb Pasha pulled it off, it can be done again.
Comment by JSAllison — 2/24/2005 @ 10:10 am
Here’s a possibility, Iraq is getting ready for war. War as a co-belligerent of the United States, against Syria. Syria’s coming under pressure from the independence movement in Lebanon, and in Iraq the media is releasing reports detailing Syrian involvement in the terrorist attacks. Syria could well face a two front conflict. 1st Front: Low level conflict in Lebanon, perhaps phasing into high level conflict as the Lebanese take up arms and start ambushing and bombing Syrian convoys and installations. (Not very likely, but still possible: An Israeli/Lebanese alliance of convenience. Hezbollah goes over to the Israeli side against Syria.) 2nd Front: Iraq, with U.S. complicity, sends guerrilla forces into Syria in support of anti-government forces there. In a sense, returning Syrian interference in kind. Ultimate goal of this whole thing? To weaken the Syrians to the point that a joint American/Iraqi invasion can swiftly topple the Syrian government and occupy the country. As for Iran? If the mullahs pull a Mussolini, Iran is toast. If the mullahs pull a Franco, they might survive; but that depends on additional factors. Dropping nukes and support for the terrorists in Iraq would help there. On the other hand, I could be doing some wicked bloviating. Time will tell.
Comment by Alan Kellogg — 2/24/2005 @ 10:19 am
Alan, that will have to be pretty far down the road. The Iraqi forces will need a lot more training and equipment before we can consider that as likely. A greater possibility, in my opinion, is that the Iraqis are training to replace the position occupied by the US military in Iraq, namely as a patrol/heavy response force. This could indicate the US either plans on removing its troops soon, or sending them somewhere else. Where that is remains to be seen.
Comment by Final Historian — 2/24/2005 @ 1:37 pm
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Pingback by On The Third Hand : Syria Under the Gun — 2/24/2005 @ 4:50 pm
Final Historian, Sometimes events force your hand. I do agree that the Iraqi army could use more time, but full blown war with Syria (and possibly Iran) may make that nigh impossible to arrange. We can hope we get the time, but Syria’s reaction to the Lebanese uprising may force our hand. In which case all we can do is do our best with what we have.
Comment by Alan Kellogg — 2/24/2005 @ 4:54 pm
Iraqi Command and Control is so far behind that it’ll be awhile before the Iraqis are fielding division size units. CENTCOM has a report on the first ING brigade to “stand alone and have direct control over an area of operation.” That brigades AO is part of Baghdad. I think spinning up ING/IA units is more for security/US troop replacemnts. Proper leadership will be the biggest step in creating larger size Iraqi units, especially now that the Iraqis are our allies. The retained commanders are basically having to unlearn years of Soviet-style tactics and then learn more Western oriented ones. The part about the Iraqi gen wanting more firepower is a perfect example of that. I’d be interested in hearing about the other units a military needs to function properly. Support/Logistics/Communications, Artillery, Air Force? CENTCOM just announced that 30 Iraqi pilots are now starting training to fly C-130s….so I’d say the Iraqi Air Force will be awhile reforming…
Comment by Mike Lech — 2/24/2005 @ 9:25 pm
Mike, At the same time, the U.S. Army is on its way to eliminating the division. Going to a hierarchy where the corp is the administrative unit, with the brigade the maneuver. We may see this implemented with the Iraqi army At the same time we should remember that nobody is really ready for a war. When war comes all you can do is hope. If your people are well trained and well equiped things should go well. But it’s not guaranteed.
Comment by Alan Kellogg — 2/24/2005 @ 10:56 pm
I was an Infantryman stationed out of Taji Iraq during OIF II working with a local ING unit outside of the wire. These were dedicated individuals to keeping there area of operations safe. Mainly because they had a special interst in the are. It was were they lived, Grew up, and worked. They had there families to protect and all haited the old government and loved the American way of life. The knew the local people and could spot an insergent a mile away. They knew of ammunition hiding places and followed up on local gossip. they were an asset. Now from what i understand the government of Iraq (with the influance of U.S. I am sure) Have moved all ING Personal away from there local are to Bagdad. What a joyas event for the insurgancy. the ING should be just that and aid there LOCAL Villages and townships, were they can do the most good.
Comment by Charles Noble — 9/16/2005 @ 12:17 pm