Austin Bay Blog

Al Qaeda assesses its mistakes. (And please see this recent post for background on other Al Qaeda documents.)

Consider “Lessons learned from the armed jihad ordeal in Syria.”

This is a long analysis (45 pages in pdf) of the Muslim Brotherhood’s war against Syria’s Assad regime, and focuses on the early 1980s.

Al Qaeda wants to learn from:

…the jihad ordeal in the past period, we should point out –as we see it from our own perspective– important and essential points that form the basis of our analysis, the methodology we used and the objectives we seek:

On Page 6:

…Obviously the most essential element of any revolutionary organization is putting forward a series of goals and slogans that attract the masses, and presenting itself as a revolutionary pioneering organization with crystal clear objectives. The true mujahideen failed to put forward their ideology, slogans and objectives via a well crafted media campaign. The majority of people were not aware of what was going on and those who followed the news knew that some Moslems youths are fighting the regime and plan on establishing “Moslem rule”, they did not explain to the people the nature and form of this “Moslem rule”, they did not explain why people should join in the fight and why they should die for that cause. The mujahideen failed to define their identity, their intentions and motivations; such an explanation was and still is the main pillar for attracting the masses and mobilizing the base members on an intellectual and ideological level to partake in this dangerous work (i.e. Jihad).

Media, revolt, “pioneering organization.” Al Qaeda paid attention to the Soviet Union’s Cold War methods for seeding and encouraging anti-Western rebels. (The document often focuses on the methods and operations of “Attalieaa” -The Vanguards- in the anti-Assad revolt.)

On page 10– a lack of OPSEC (operatonal security) and “strike back” capability hindered the Syrian movement:

The hosting regimes infiltrated our organizations, monitored all our activities, restricted and chocked us, and in some cases arrested or killed our members and representatives. It is true the battle was in Syria; nevertheless we needed to have military deterrence capabilities on the outside; to help us fend off an enemy able to trace and monitor our movements in our new homes.
Many Arab and Moslem regimes ganged up on us by aiding and abetting the enemy, it is enough to mention that while we were suffering from death, destruction and a daunting war; Arab oil money was flowing to the “Alawite” Hafez Assad to pay for the bullets killing our Moslem youth, and for building prisons to incarcerate and torture our brethren. Most of the Arab Moslem gulf countries considered Hafez Assad and his regime as apostate blasphemers yet for political interests and for the purpose of maintaining balance of power; they flooded his “Alawite occupying” regime with billions of dollars. In short the lack of military operations on the outside prevented us from deterring the enemy and his friends and supporters.

On page 11 — the failure of Muslim organizations to instill genuine “hard militancy.” This puts the Cartoon Wars in a new light. Al Qaeda has had ten to fifteen years to “harden” these organizations.

Inability to transform civilian Islamic missionary groups into military organizations capable of resistance and self defense:
This could be the most valuable lesson relating to the Islamic missionary groups in the Arab & Moslem countries. The battle may have erupted unexpectedly; however a large sector of the Moslems (Especially the leaders) knew that it was inevitable, those leaders did not prepare nor plan. Those missionary groups brought their peaceful missionary style and methods to the fight, the sheik failed miserably when he wore the general’s hat. It is astonishing to see and hear leaders of Moslem organizations preaching jihad and claiming that dieing for “Allah” is their ultimate wish, yet they fail for tens of years to instruct religiously and train militarily for that fight, they could not produce documents for emergency (e.g. passports), or save money for tough times. They were unable to mobilize effectively and in a hurry, those organizations were ineffective and eventually collapsed.

But to Al Qaeda’s strategists, Syria proved to them that some form of Islamist revolution would work.

Events proved that mobilizing armed Moslem masses in the cause of an Islamic jihad revolution is possible; provided that the leaders prove their ability to fight oppression and set a good example in daring and sacrifice. The 18 months of military jihad -with all its shortcomings- brought hundreds of thousands of Moslems to the streets chanting: down with oppression, down with the regime, long live jihad, give us arms to fight with honor, the city of Hamah experience proved that thousands of Moslems answered the call and fought side by side with our mujahideen. Events proved how giving our people are, leaders sprouted from within and produced magnificent military cadres both in leadership and discipline.

BUsh and Rumsfeld weren’t the first to apply the term “long war” to this struggle. Al Qaeda used it. On page 19:

The struggle for the sake and path of “Allah” is not called:”Jihad” for nothing, the term “Jihad” literally means: “exerting a tiring effort to set up”. The enemy is strong and powerful, we are weak and poor, the war duration is going to be long and the best way to fight it is in a revolutionary jihad way for the sake of “Allah”. The preparations better be deliberate, comprehensive, and properly planed, taking into account past experiences and lessons.

Centralization of planning but a “high degree” of field autonomy isn’t an accident.

Page 20:

Decentralization in the management of the military operations:
To yield high dividends; the military high command managing this type of battles must have centralized planning and strategy, they could heat up an area or cool another to affect the flow of the war, they should be able to maintain harmony among the forces and ranks, distribute and move weaponry, supplies, personnel to different locations according to need. From this perspective centralization is essential; on the other hand the nature of this type of war requires that the regional and field commanders be awarded a high level of autonomy in planning and managing their own affairs. The experiences of gang warfare around the world –whether ancient or contemporary– has proven that this style is necessary and very effectiveness.

The war is also expensive. From page 21:

Experiences teach us that a mujahid revolutionary movement that utilizes a gang warfare will be very expensive, costing millions per day ranging from weaponry, armaments and munitions, supporting the mujahideen, providing them with shelter and aiding their families, providing documentation, and paying for the battle expenses. Now we understand why the holy Koran and the speeches of the prophet tied the physical jihad to financial jihad. Money plays an influential role in this war; it can not be planed for, nor initiated prior to finding a solution to this conundrum. Our experiences as well as the experiences of other nations where gang warfare took place teach us that for the revolutionary leadership to be in control of its decisions, capabilities and destiny, and for this war to succeed it should be self sufficient and financed from within. However the primary source of financing for this war should be obtained through raiding resources of the enemy (Its budget, weapons, resources and money), otherwise the leadership of the jihad movement will be subject to the control, demands and interests of the financers.

Al Qaeda antiticpated a US-led “financial squeeze.” How successful it’s been in maintaining “internal funding” is another issue. However, Iraqis told me in 2004 that their police suspected much of the kidnapping of Iraqi citizens was done by criminal organizations hired by either “former regime elements” (Saddam) or Al Qaeda, with the purpose of generating funds to feed their respective operations.

The section on communication is a must read. An excerpt:

These days communication is the nerve of all modern armies in the world, and revolutionary gang warfare organizations are no exception, it may not be as vital to them as it is to conventional armies but it is still very important nevertheless. Communications could be the weak link and expose the mujahideen to the enemy. In our Syrian experience communications at all levels were carried out via courier, or through pre arranged meetings, wireless communication was not utilized till later in the battle, coordination with the leaderships and supporters out side Syria was conducted via courier too, Towards the end of the war the “Moslem Brotherhood” resorted to airing coded messages to the inside on their radio station in Iraq.

Pages 28 and 29 discuss intelligence gathering and organizational structure. “Pyramid” and “thread” organizational structures are both analyzed. An excerpt:

Some times a combination of both structures (the pyramid hierarchy and the thread connection) yields great results because it provides the leadership with the ability to maneuver, this of course depends on the situation. Many European gang organizations were able through experience to develop very accurate and durable methods that helped it withstand the onslaught of very advanced and powerful security organizations; (e.g. the red brigades of Italy, Badder Meinhoff of Germany and the Spanish separatist organization ETA). Our experience taught us that security and strength of an organization could be contradictory to its growth or ease of management.

The pyramid: “The most popular form of secretive organizations is the pyramid hierarchy structure, where information and command goes up or down effectively and in a speedy manner…”

The thread (incorrect spellings are from the translated text): “A leadership member “Tip of the thread” is connected to a series of clusters, those clusters are not connected to each other and are usually composed of one or two individuals, this burdens the “tip of the thread” with a lot of responsibilities and requires dedicated effort on his part. If a member is arrested he does not cause a major threat to the entire organization because he does not know much. This system though secure, is week, because if the “tip of the tread” is captured, all the clusters are compromised…”

On page 34 we hear an echo of von Clausewitz:

The Jihad revolutionary war just like any other war is political at heart; it is politically and ideologically motivated, the military activity is merely the tool or means to achieve that objective. (Without military activity the revolution will loose its impact and have no chance of success). The military operations could be extremely successful yet if that capital is not expended in accordance with a clear political vision and strategy, and a well crafted public relations campaign we will only gain titles for our martyrs and tears for their blood. We have to stress (and make sure we do not forget) that the battle is political at the core; the political effort should receive the same attention and be treated as importantly as the military effort is.