Looking toward Asia
US Representative Rick Larsen (D-Washington State) discusses US security and economic interests in Asia and the Pacific. The link is to The Seattle Post-Intelligencer.
Laresen concentrates on China-Taiwan and Japan. I think the emerging Asian triangle that bears watching is Australia-Singapore-India. Anglophiles may see a historical connection?once again former British colonies find common ground in economics and security.
In the early 1990s, as the Cold War was concluding, Andrew Marshall, Director of the Office of Net Assessments (SecDef’s personal think tank) said in the long-term the rise of China would be the most significant US economic and security challenge.
Larsen points out:
Some members of Congress believe the anti-secession law heats up China-Taiwan relations and will force the United States to evaluate whether our security footprint in the region is as robust as it needs to be.
Adding to this tension is the European Union’s consideration of lifting the ban on weapons sales to China. The EU initiated the ban five [ED:See note.]years ago after Chinese troops opened fire on protesters in Tiananmen Square. The United States maintains its embargo and fears that lifting the EU ban increases China’s access to weapons and technology that could further destabilize cross-strait relations. Rice must communicate these concerns to Chinese leaders.
U.S.-China relations are at a near-high point. That is good for those in the Northwest who believe our economic future is tied to building closer relationships with countries in the Asian-Pacific region. Yet, that future depends on how well the United States and China manage their mutual security interests. Our nation must firmly state our security interests in order to build the necessary foundation to ensure a positive future for our region’s economic interests.
Where’s North Korea? China is the key to disarming North Korea, and everyone –including Kim Jong Il– knows it.
NOTE: Comment 1: Tianamen Square was 1989– fifteen years ago. I assumed that was an editing error. I’ve made a mark in the text.
Wasn’t the Tienanmen Square massacre fifteen years ago, not “five”? What would the Chinese say if the Japanese announced that they considered Korea a “renegade province” (Chosen) but were willing to postpone invasion and would be “very patient” as long as consultations were held and the Koreans didn’t say any nasty things like that they would prefer to be independent?
Comment by Robert Speirs — 3/18/2005 @ 2:36 pm
Don’t underestimate the Austrailian-Japanese ties, or even a U.S.-Japan-Austrailia triangle. Austrailia and Japan are each others biggest trading partners (Guess who’s number 2 for each?) There’s already been strengthening of military ties between Japan and the U.S. and given the Aussie-American military ties, putting together the third Aussie-Japan leg is natural, if it hasn’t occurred already. Of course this could mesh easily with the triple alliance that Austin talks about, which would create a cresent around China (with its apparent issues) and around SE Asia/Phillipines with their chaotic/Islamist problems.
Comment by AnotherScott — 3/18/2005 @ 3:17 pm
Jim Bennett has written a lot about these kinds of links in his UPI columns and in his 2004 book “Anglosphere Challenge: Why the English-Speaking Nations will lead the way in the 21st Century.” (www.anglospherechallenge.com) He’s very much convinced that India will have a major role to play as Anglosphere commercial, legal, and language ties create what he calls a “cricket-and-baseball” alliance — the Anglosphere plus Japan, maybe Korea. Vibrant defense ties come out of these sentimental and selfish reasons for cultural ties.
Comment by James McCormick — 3/18/2005 @ 3:31 pm
A couple of points on the security situation in Asia: 1) As Japan moves closer to the US and also espouses a more robust foreign policy role, it is likely to increase security competition in the arena. Despite the passage of time, states in the region fear Japan. Off the top of my head, I think it likely that closer relations with a stronger Japan will accelerate the split of the US-South Korean alliance, give NK an even itchier trigger finger, and stimulate a more aggressive, security oriented Chinese foreign policy. 2) While it is far to early for anything but guesstimates on how this will all shake up, my guess would be that Asia drifts more towards regional bipolarity in the years to come. On one side, the US, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the Phillipines, Vietnam and, broadening things a bit, India. On the other, China and its satellites (of which Singapore will have trouble not becoming), North Korea and depending on the direction of SK, even SK in this axis. The Koreas have almost always been under the sway of China or Japan and the Japanese have generally had to keep them that way through force, while China has an assortment of tools. 3) You mention mutual security interests in your post. While these are certainly important, the clashing security interests are equally so. China wants Taiwan. China fears Japan and does not want a US involved extensively in Asia unless it is sitting on Japan. China will be able to use its economic clout and its geography to woo/sway states uncertain about the US will and committment in Asia. Balancing or bandwagoning will be the options on the menu for states in Asia in the years to come.
Comment by Sean Giovanello — 3/18/2005 @ 3:49 pm
I think your Australia-Singapore-India axis is far too broad geographically and politically. The countries of concern in the Pacific region are Japan, China, and the Koreas, while really the primary one in the Indian Ocean is, naturally, India as dictated by its unilateral Gujral Doctrine. Australia is involved in the concerns of both these areas, as is India given its greater significance worldwide. Though the U.S. is undoubtedly a player in the region, it is important to note that the emerging rivalry in the region, if we are to assume such a vast playing field, would be between India and China, the two countries with the greatest population masses, the largest amount of progressive industrialization, and the two countries that will be the respective hegemons of the Indian and Pacific oceans. If India is to achieve its goal of attaining a blue water navy within the next decade, it is possible that it can makeup the current deficit that exists in terms of power balances between it and China. The region will undoubtedly be bipolar, barring some massive population shift or extermination, but it will be between India, with the U.S. and India as its secondary supporters, and China.
Comment by Neil — 3/18/2005 @ 4:10 pm
Sorry, in that last paragraph I meant to say “U.S. and Japan” as its secondary supporters, not “U.S. and India.”
Comment by Neil — 3/18/2005 @ 4:11 pm
I’m inclined to agree with Neil, although I don’t think the U.S. role in the region will be all that secondary. While relations between the U.S. and China are likely to remain manageable, there are simply too many areas of strategic disagreement for them to remain amicable–not least, China’s belief that it is destined to replace the U.S. as the world’s leading power. India and the U.S., OTOH, share several important common interests: a commitment to democratic government, an interest in containing radical Islam, and an interest in containing China’s ambitions. I expect our strategic ties with India to grow over the next decade; the administration’s recent overtures are an interesting first step.
Comment by utron — 3/18/2005 @ 5:57 pm
US security interests in Asia have always, and will remain in the foreseeable future, centered around its shield of Pacific islands surrounding the Asian mainland, which is centered in Japan. Obviously, the powder keg in Asia is the Korean peninsula, which has inextricably tied itself to all of the major players in Northeast Asia. I think it’s an oversimplification to claim that Korea, North or South, is under the “sway” of larger powers - rarely do people claim the Benelux countries to be under the constant influence of France, Germany, or Britain, as a parallel. But it can easily be seen that imbalances in those countries can cause regional tension, particularly so for the Koreans because both sides carry WMDs, a fact rarely mentioned. In fact, Japanese concerns have recently shifted to SOUTH Korea, which few have doubts could capably build a nuclear weapon and long-range missiles in a short period; as proof, South Korea maintains a vast number of nuclear reactors and its scientists regularly work with JSA and NASA. China in my opinion is not nearly the threat that Americans like to claim it is; that is not to say that China is not an emerging power or that it does not clearly have ambitions of surpassing American influence in Asia. The main concern with China, however, is not necessarily its ability to surpass the United States; instead, I would contend that the threat of China is that its rapid development falters in the midst of its rising nationalist wave. Countries which have risen to the world stage have ALWAYS become extremely ambitious and nationalist, from manifest destiny in the United States to imperial ambitions by European nation-states or Japan. China may be particularly worrisome given its bitter history of failed ambition after failed ambition from the Opium Wars to the Cultural Revolution - in short, China may have a bigger chip on its shoulder than most. But, witness the way that its neighbors and the US have been trying to cut this off, allowing China to maintain an impossibly large trade imbalance and an unsustainable currency. Taiwan in particular has sought to make itself indispensable to Beijing economically, which makes a decision to invade much harder given the scare to investors and the destruction of critical necessities to the Chinese economy. As far as the nations to watch, I think it’s incorrect to say the former British colonies are more in cohoots than they have been before; after all, you failed to mention Hong Kong (though it is part of China) as a necessary key. Australia has been more assertive than ever in regional conflicts though it restricts itself given the bitterness many people such as Malays and Indonesians have towards Westerners. India is trying to pull the same games as China though it is even more mired in a petty conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir than China is over Taiwan; at least the Chinese and the Taiwanese can do business together without being forced. The War on Terror has necessitated a greater focus on South and Southeast Asia given the number of poor and unstable governments, many of which have problems with terrorists and guerrillas. The Asian Economic crisis of 1997 also hit the region much harder than it did Northeast Asia. I see Australia being given a greater role by the Americans in security concerns, especially with the Aussies’ commitment to fighting terror in Iraq (of course, the bombing in Bali made the War on Terror much more real and Al Qaeda has yet to target Northeast Asia).
Comment by Perry — 3/18/2005 @ 6:02 pm
China’s irrendentism, as well as its gender imbalance, would prove to be deciding factors just about anywhere. India and Pakistan, while armed to the teeth against each other, are not about to annihilate each other. The situation with North and South Korea is not as stable, but is similar. The situation with Taiwan and China is, on the surface, the most stable of these three areas, but because it is one in which the Chinese people are directly involved, the problems of irredentist nationalism will only be exacerbated by a surplus of unemployed young men.
Comment by Bruce Chang — 3/18/2005 @ 7:23 pm
Singapore will remain a member of the Anglosphere by dint of language, culture, economics, and politics, and will not, and probably never, become a chinese satellite. Don’t forget, most of us Singaporeans were descendents of immigrants from China, and the mainland Chinese have often regarded us as useless castoffs of ignorant villagers from South China. That said, China’s overt strategic goals have often been demonized by US pundits, which I find rather amusing. China doesn’t want to dominate the world; it simply isn’t in the chinese cultural psyche to do so, or else the chinese would have conquered the world long ago. They only want respect and moderate influence over East Asia, over what were historically their vassal and client states. Countries like Korea, Vietnam. And for other countries(like the US) to stay out of what they regard as their sphere of power ie. East Asia. However, once that has been accomplished, it’s likely China will be content. I certainly don’t see them trying to muscle into other parts of the world ala the Soviet Union. Chinese culture is still very insular. 2000+ years of Chinese history has been full of such expansion-up-to-a-point developments. Chinese nationalism is different from European colonialism. Asia will remain balanced between India, China, and Japan for the foreseeable future, and such a tripartite balance would be quite stable. Also important to note is that none of these states are currently friendly towards economic socialism, which bodes well in terms of developing economic networks that make open conflict between states bad for business. In short, as long as China is given economic incentives to commit to development, nobody is going to rock the boat, and even the Taiwan issue is more face-saving talk from the PRC government. Of course, there is North Korea, which is the fly in the proverbial ointment.
Comment by The Wobbly Guy — 3/19/2005 @ 7:32 am
Excellent, that was really well explained and helpful
カジノ
Comment by カジノ — 4/25/2005 @ 4:31 am
It was mentioned a while back that the options for Asian states in years to come will be between bandwagoning and balancing. Do you think the bandwagoning theory provides theoretical leverage in explaining Asian security relationships?
Comment by Jane — 4/28/2005 @ 10:01 am
There’s an excellent page on a major and under-reported development in Asia, ‘Japan Forges Strategic Link With India, Another Emerging Superpower’ on the ‘New World Order Intelligence Update’ current news page. There’s also a detailed and sombering warning on Iran, by Svott ritter, there - ‘Sleepwalking To Disaster In Iraq’
Comment by Paula McKenzie — 4/30/2005 @ 9:35 am