Austin Bay Blog

I just visited Michelle Malkin’s site and several other blogs discussing an allegedly leaked version of the Giulaina Sgrena shooting incident. (It would be more accurate to call it the Nicola Calpari shooting incident– after all, the Italian secret service agent is the person who died in the tragedy on Route Irish. ) A blogstorm has ignited over the significance of the alleged leaked, and the possibility that classified information is contained in the document.

The biggest worry isn’t specific details of the incident, but confirmation of coalition tactics, techniques, and procedures. Like the “Zarqawi CD” Kurds intercepted in early 2004 (it gave coalition forces an insight into Zarqawi’s strategic thinking, eg, he saw an Iraqi democracy as his biggest threat) many of the “accidentally released” details will confirm intelligence data the enemy has collected by observing US and coalition convoy movements in and around Baghdad.

That being noted, a little military adaptation will overcome this foolish mistake. I’ll show why/how in a moment. For background, here is my post of March 9, 2005 on the Sgrena incident and Route Irish Racing (my section’s term for the mad dash from Baghdad International Airport to downtown Baghdad and the Green Zone).

Is the document the real thing? I went to the Corriere della Serra website and scanned the alledged investigation report. In terms of language and organization is reads like an official summary of a military investigation. If it’s a forgery, then the forger has accurate names, ranks, units, and geographic data.

As I scanned it I thought about the investigations I’ve handled or helped conduct. To say that the Sgrena investigation was “an ultra high pressure assignment” understates the case. I don’t envy the investigating officers. With over thirty years active and reserve time in the military, I’ve had my share (and my fill) of accident and incident investigations. (Most of mine were mundane, addressing manuever damage claims or traffic accidents. Two involved accidental deaths. In one of them I helped another investigating officer take witness statements and finish his report. That was an education, particularly for a novelist who’s written three mysteries. My help really wasn’t required. The intial investigating officer was a military policeman and he conducted the investigation with the insistent thoroughness of an experienced detective. His eye for detail was extraordinary. )

There are some things that strike me as odd in the “leaked” Sgrena report’s format, but that may be the way the Word Document I scanned translates from the PDF. S/NF usually means “Secret/No Foreign” (classified secret, not for distribution beyond US personnel).

From the Corriere della Sera document, a description of the blocking position (BP541) Sgrena’s vehicle approached:

(U) BP 541 was located on the on-ramp from southbound Route Vernon onto westbound Route Irish approximately six miles west of the International Zone in Baghdad. Specifically, BP 541 (Grid 38S MB3571 8371) was located at the intersection of Route Vernon and Route Irish, which is the second intersection on Route Irish east of Baghdad International Airport (BIAP). The road leading to the on-ramp begins where the westernmost lane of Route Vernon separates from the highway. The on-ramp itself begins near a side street that borders the edge of a housing area on the west side of the road. This point is approximately 640 meters south of the nearby underpass on Route Vernon, and approximately 380 meters from where the road to the on-ramp splits from Route Vernon. (Annexes 141K, 144K).
(U) At the interchange of the on-ramp and Route Vernon, the highway becomes an overpass extending over Route Irish. Three separate concrete Jersey barriers are located in the on-ramp to Route Irish. The barriers are arranged with the first two barriers on the right hand side of the on-ramp and the third one on the left hand side of the on-ramp, but not in a serpentine configuration, as one approaches from the north. The first barrier is approximately 75 meters from the concrete abutment of the Route Vernon overpass near the beginning of the on-ramp. The second barrier is approximately 37 meters beyond the first barrier (112 meters from the concrete abutment). The third barrier is approximately 31 meters beyond the second barrier (143 meters from the abutment). This third, or southernmost, barrier is approximately 80 meters from where the on-ramp merges with westbound Route Irish. The total length of the on-ramp is approximately 223 meters. (Annexes 142K, 144K).
(U) From the vantage point of the southernmost barrier, Route Irish is directly south of the position with a 50-meter median separating the eastbound and westbound lanes. To the north and northwest of the position, there is a large open area that is littered with garbage and debris. The field extends from the bottom of the on-ramp to the side street and west. Immediately beyond the side street, approximately 150 meters from the southernmost barrier, is a large housing community with windows and porches that overlook the on-ramp. There is a clear line of sight from the houses to the on-ramp. The
23 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED
Route Vernon overpass stands several stories higher than the on-ramp and runs parallel to the on-ramp until the on-ramp curves to the southwest, approximately 50 meters from the beginning of the on-ramp. The overpass is supported by large cylinder concrete supports. The ground under the overpass is also littered with garbage and debris. (Annexes 16K, 143K).
(U) The road itself is concrete. There is a slight elevation gain between the beginning of the on-ramp and its merger with Route Irish. The curve is banked slightly. The on-ramp, but for the Jersey barriers, is wide enough to accommodate two vehicles abreast of each other, i.e., it is two-lanes wide. (Annexes 16K, 19K).

“Jersey” barriers are small concrete barriers (larger ones are dubbed “Texas” barriers). Having driven Route Irish at least two-dozen times I’ve been under the overpass described, but I was going 65 to 70 miles an hour.

The report’s next section names names. Releasing the names of the US soldiers involved in the incident exposes them and their families to political and –unfortunately– physical attack. However, the troops’ names will ultimately come out– reporters know who the troops are. The leaked report’s appearance on the Internet makes it easier for politically-motivated jerks to harrass the soldiers’ families. (I see one of the troops at the roadblock is identified as a New York Army National Guardsman who is also a policeman. Note my comments on my experience with the military police investigator. The odds are this soldier is an exceptionally credible witness.)

These three folks are well known:

11. (U) Mr. Nicola Calipari was an Italian military intelligence officer with the rank of Major General who was in charge of the recovery of Ms. Sgrena on 4 March 2005. (Annex 104C).
12. (U) Mr. Andrea Carpani is an Italian military intelligence officer with the rank of Major in the Carabinieri with years of experience working and driving in Baghdad. He was driving the car involved in the incident on 4 March 2005. (Annex 104C).
13. (U) Ms. Giuliana Sgrena is an Italian journalist for Il Manifesto. She had been kidnapped and held hostage in Baghdad for one month at the time of her release on the night of 4 March 2005. (Annex 103C).

The document describes the incident in compelling detail– including a US soldier aiding the wounded Ms. Sgrena.

Here are the report’s findings:

U) No U.S. military personnel within MNF-I, MNC-I (to include Captain Green), or subordinate units were informed by the Government of Italy of the hostage rescue mission that occurred on 4 March 2005. (Annexes 1C to 56C, 58C to 63C, 65C to 72C, 76C, 78C, 80C, 82C, 84C, 86C, 88C, 90C, 92C, 96C to 99C, 110C, 114C, 126C, 7M).

(U) Not coordinating with U.S. personnel was a conscious decision on the part of the Italians as they considered the hostage recovery an Intelligence mission and a national issue. (Annex 100C).

(U) Based upon previous successful coordination efforts by 3ID and 2/10 MTN working with organizations from various agencies outside their chain of command, it is clear that, while the hostage recovery operation may have otherwise been a success, prior coordination might have prevented this tragedy. Iraq is still a hostile environment, i.e, a combat zone, and the more coordination that can be done to increase situational awareness of those operating within the battlespace, the better it is for all involved. (Annex 65C).

Based on my initial scan (okay, parts of it I’ve now read closely) I don’t see anything in it that a clever terrorist wouldn’t already know about Route Irish traffic control points and blocking positions, or coalition tactics.

The document’s summary data for attacks is probably “officially” classified, but remember attacks and foiled attacks (disarmed IEDs) are also reported to Iraqi and international media. Knowledgeable analysts and reporters produce unclassified guesstimates that closely track classified data by compiling daily unclassified reports.

The comment on changing VIP travel in adverse weather (from helicopter to ground) may confirm something the terrorists suspected. Attacking a specific VIP convoy, however, is very tough to do.

The “classified” sections on “Rhino Bus” (armored bus) convoy operations leave me cold, but for that matter, so do the unclassified sections. If I could erase anything from the posted document it would be this material– but I can’t. Once it’s on the Internet it’s out there. (The Rhino Bus schlepps US and coalition personnel between installations in Baghdad. It’s an impressive beast with bullet-proof glass and armor.)

That’s my gut reaction. Now a cooler caveat. Close observation of the freeway gives a clever enemy many of those details, and Route Irish passes hundreds of houses and apartment buildings– each one a p0tential observation post. The Rhino Bus material from the report (probably) confirms the details gleaned by enemy observers.

So how do we deal with it? The enemy knows what we want to do (move the Rhino Bus). He knows how we’ve done it in the past (based on his intelligence gathering and now this report).

Commanders will now change the routine– amend convoy times, vary routes, vary convoy vehicle mix, vary the lay-down of traffic control points. (The Sunni holdouts and Zarqawi’s klan change tactics and procedures– it’s a vicious dynamic of war. )

I agree with Michelle on this point: “Yes, someone on our side screwed up bigtime in leaving the redacted portions in the PDF file.” Anti-Americans, Islamo-fascists, and Islamo-fascist sympathizers have and will continue to use this incident –and any other incident– to attack coalition morale and attempt to undermine American credibility. The irony is, this “alledged” report is filled with details. On the other hand, Ms. Sgrena’s “details” tend to shift (recall her story, “My Truth”?). “>

Reports indicate a US spy satellite recorded the incident, and supports the US troops’ accounts. Of course this will make no difference to DailyKos inmates or Earth’s George Galloways. However, “overhead systems” (Predators, satellites, tethered sensor balloons, manned aircraft, etc) watch Iraq 24/7.

From AFP:

A US satellite reportedly recorded a checkpoint shooting in Iraq last month, enabling investigators to reconstruct how fast a car carrying a top Italian intelligence official and a freed hostage was traveling when US troops opened fire.

The report, which aired Thursday on CBS News, said US investigators concluded from the recording that the car was traveling at a speed of more than 60 miles (96 km) per hour.

Giuliana Sgrena has said the car was traveling at a normal speed of about 30 miles an hour when the soldiers opened fired, wounding her and killing Nicola Calipari, the Italian agent who had just secured her release from a month’s captivity.

US soldiers said at the time of the March 4 incident that the car approached at a high rate of speed and that they fired only after it failed to respond to hand signals, flashing bright lights and warning shots.

The conflicting accounts were among a number of differences that have prevented US and Italian authorities from reaching agreement on what happened…

Here’s the link to Corriere della Sera and the investigation report. Here’s an “unredacted version” on a website (ht patterico)

I’ll try to get back to this subject tomorrow, and give it a more thorough read. This is a complex document covering a complicated incident.

UPDATE: I see one commenter wants me to tell him this is a clever disinformation operation and not a foul-up. Follow Occam’s Razor– this is a foul-up. It does put a certain class of anti-American critic in a peculiar bind. If the “classified” material is accurate, and the critics accept the information as accurate, then why aren’t the US conclusions (findings) also accurate? Particularly if there is satellite backup?

UPDATE 2: [ED: I meant comments 14 and 15– now corrected.]Comment 14– There are a lot of people who will agree with you, in part because the mistakes are finesseable. See my first update on the critics’ bind– that bind may feed a few conspiracy theories. To my knowledge no official, unclassified version has been released, though I just read one is forthcoming. It will be useful to compare the officially released version with the “leaked” document. Under any circumstances I’ll stick with what I wrote about the Rhino Bus– that bus is a big target. Comment 15– See what I wrote about overhead systems. CBS’ track record for accurate facts is –what’s the apt description– leaves much to be desired?

UPDATE 3: Comment 16. The “intentional mistake” scenario (releasing classified material to attract attention) makes sense. Has plausible deniability, etc. Let me add a couple of speculations to your speculation. I think we’d agree that “Office of Strategic Influence” types might try something like that, or at least suggest it. If your scenario turns out to be the factual case, they’ll draw fire for it. Why do I think it’s not a calculated leak? I’ve just seen too many military foul-ups– SNAFU, failures in “head space and timing.” Dumb rules the world. “If it can go wrrong it will.” Under any circumstances– clever marketing techniques or SNAFU– I don’t like the release of the convoy information. So here’s another scenario– a coalition troop convoy is struck by a VBIED, or the Rhino Bus gets attacked. Reporter: “Did the accidental or designed release of the Sgrena Affair and the convoy information contained in that document contribute to the success of this terrorist attack?” Fair question? Of course. The government spokesman replies that the military changed tactics but the enemy got lucky– and that’s a truthful answer. But if lives are lost, the press will get bulldog vicious if it’s determined the “leak” was intentional, versus merely obnoxious if the leak’s a foul-up. That’s a form of blowback the smart guys you suspect had better have an answer for. Anyway, let’s log this update as discussion, not debate, and certainly discussion based on speculation from experience, not immediate access to ground truth facts.