Austin Bay Blog

Security Management Magazine’s April 2005 issue ran an article by Scott Ast on security training for workers in Iraq. The link goes to the home page– for some reason the page won’t give me a direct link to the article. {ED: See update below, with working link.]

The information iis solid– a quick suvival manual. But here’s the real bonus: This article also gives a reader the “feel” of Iraq –and for that matter, a dozen other hard corners where aid workers are at risk– without sensationalizing hype.

Ast has been there:

Iraq is a country of extreme beauty, but it also presents extreme challenges, both natural and manmade. Thus, arriving in Baghdad can be a physical and psychological shock and personnel should be prepared. It starts with how the plane lands. As a defensive maneuver, approaching planes typically corkscrew down to a landing strip that appears to be directly below where the planes began their descent. The drop can be harrowing as well as nauseating, and stepping off the plane with a full airsickness bag in hand is not the best way to start an assignment.

As the operational security manager for Black & Veatch, an engineering and construction firm in Overland Park, Kansas, I visited Iraq several times, most recently in May of 2004, to provide security inspections and oversee the security operations of my employer, which has been contributing to programs called Restore Iraqi Electricity and Restore Iraqi Infrastructure. My responsibilities included training our engineering and construction personnel, who volunteered to deploy to Iraq, for the challenges of the mission. I have had the chance to see firsthand what worked best in terms of the pre-mission training and what needed improvement. While elections have occurred since that time, the violence has not abated. Consequently, the lessons learned are still valid for anyone headed to Iraq in the future.

Ast stresses physical and mental preparation (prior to deployment). In a section titled “Beware Loose Lips” he stresses “op sec” — operational security. The less said about where you’re going and what you’re doing, the better. Expect extremes in temperature (no kidding). It’s tough to get there from here– so plan for transportation. And when moving:

…It pays to be “consistently inconsistent” in Iraq, never traveling at the same times and on the same routes if possible. I also encourage our professionals to practice the “buddy system” with colleagues. That is, when they are up and around, traveling in PSDs or in other settings, they should check up on each other. ..

For background read my column on “Route Irish Racing”– I don’t mention jumbling travel times, but that’s the way you do it if you intend to keep doing it.

Ast says workers must have emergency plans in place– know what you’re going to do:

I have always operated on the “Six P Principle,” which is shorthand for “Proper Planning Prevents Pretty Poor Performance.” Relying on the U.S. government or military is not always an option, so internal readiness, coupled with mutual assistance and contingency arrangements with others, is mandatory.
It is critical to have self-explanatory emergency action plans in Iraq and for workers to be well-acquainted with them so that all players will know their roles and be ready to act after being shaken out of bed by a missile, mortar, or small-arms-fire attack. ..

This is a civilian version of military SOP and immediate action drill.

Have plans for (1) Medical assistance. (2) Evacuations. (3) Communications.

Ast adds this detail (and it’s a real concern):

An important precaution before entering any shelter is to check for desert pests such as scorpions and camel spiders. This is especially true in the hottest part of the day; they love the shade.
Poor attention to evacuation procedures left me with an extremely sore jaw in one case. When a Katyusha rocket whizzed over our camp early one cool morning, two workers in a panic sped face first into each other. After the impact, one of them continued running, crashing his forehead into my jaw.

The “Physical Security” section is worth quoting in detail:

Physical security.

Even nonsecurity personnel should at least be familiar with the basics of effective physical security in the Iraq environment. They should understand what security purposes are served by equipment and personnel. These include the role of barriers, staffing, and protection from projectiles. They should also understand the proper use of security lighting.

Barriers. Barriers, such as Jersey and Hesco (collapsible wire-mesh containers with a heavy-duty plastic liner, filled with sand, dirt or gravel, as described by the Army News Service), are an important piece of a layered defense system. Hesco barriers, single rows or double-stacked, are quickly installed economical protection that provide peace of mind.

In addition, preformed, tall concrete walls can be stood on end and fused together to form barriers. Topping these and existing walls with concertina wire and adding observation towers provides for solid reinforcement, protection, and response. Concrete barriers forming vehicle entry points and reinforced guardhouses provide protection for checkpoints.

Manpower. Observation towers and vehicle entry posts must be staffed with properly trained, equipped, vetted, and supervised security officers who guard specific posts. Additional backup and mobile security guards should operate in tandem to form a proper security force. Concerns include training and drills, standard operating procedure, weapons proficiency, and rules of engagement, to name a few.

Projectile protection. Interior layers of defense include sandbags or Hesco barriers surrounding mobile units/trailers serving as offices or living quarters. Wherever possible, units should be constructed without windows to limit the potential for glass projectiles resulting from blasts.

Personnel should keep work areas away from windows, and if there is window glass, it should be taped over or laminated for protection from flying fragments after a blast.

Steel plating is often inserted into mobile unit walls, roofs, and flooring to provide additional protection from projectiles. In those cases, staff need not be as concerned with being near a wall. Stacking sandbags along any structure provides additional peace of mind.

Lighting. As opposed to a security setting in a stable society, lighting in Iraq is less a deterrent than a risk. Personnel should be informed that lighting actually provides targets for insurgents’ small-arms fire, mortars, or rockets. And too much lighting allows insurgents to observe the numbers of protective personnel, their equipment, and level of expertise.
Night-vision equipment is useful for those tasked with watching for signs of movement outside of the perimeter. There are, however, times when lights must be used. Emergency lighting and generators are indispensable, and spotlights, whether portable for vehicles or mounted in observation towers, are handy as well.
In a theater of war, of course, personnel must continually update risk analysis and reevaluate the security posture. Countermeasures must constantly be refined to correspond to threat levels and enemy tactics. Thus, personnel should expect constant readjustment of security measures…

Read the whole thing. It’s a keeper.

UPDATE: Here’s a link to page one of the article (thanks to Commenter 2).